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READING THE PRISONER’S LETTER:
ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
IN INMATE CORRESPONDENCE
GREGORY SISK, MICHELLE KING, JOY NISSEN BEITZEL,
BRIDGET DUFFUS & KATHERINE KOEHLER*
No one in our society has a more compelling need to communicate in
complete confidence with a lawyer than a prisoner, when challenging a
conviction as wrongful or prison conditions as unlawful. No one has a
greater need to be able to engage in the uninhibited discussion of highly
personal matters, tragic events, and official misconduct. A prisoner’s
constitutional rights to freedom of speech, access to the courts, due process,
and assistance of counsel are placed in unique jeopardy when a correctional
system insists on prying into the substantive contents of legal mail.
In this Article, we explain the vital need for confidentiality in prisoner
correspondence with legal counsel to avoid chilling prisoner expression and
allow lawyers to ethically and effectively represent prisoners; survey the
written policies of the nation’s correctional systems regarding legal mail;
describe and analyze the constitutional protections for prisoners in
confidential correspondence with lawyers through the rights of free speech,
due process, access to the courts, and assistance of counsel; and address the
procedural steps and obstacles for a prisoner to seek relief from the courts
when that confidentiality is breached by prison policies or practices.
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INTRODUCTION
[E]ven in a jail, or perhaps especially there, the relationships
which the law has endowed with particularized confidentiality must
continue to receive unceasing protection . . . .1
Death row has historically been a lonely place. And for most of its
history, death row in Arizona was a “uniquely severe environment.”2 Each
1

Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143–44 (1962).
Brief of the Arizona Capital Representation Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant and in Favor of Reversal at 6 (authored by Amy Armstrong and Natman
Schaye), Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-15738). In recent years,
judges have suggested that systems of solitary confinement may impose torture in violation of
2
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inmate lived in a single cell—11’ 7” by 7’ 9”—with a combination
toilet/sink, a desk, a stool, and a hard platform for a bed.3 The cell was
constantly and brightly illuminated through the day and night.4 Poor airflow
and humid conditions produced “a foul and stagnant smell.”5 The
condemned were denied contact with any other prisoner, received their meals
through the cell door, and were confined for up to 23 hours a day, other than
when they were moved in full restraints to another no-contact secured area
for shower or exercise.6 A description of solitary confinement by a former
inmate in another prison captures the isolation experienced by the men in the
death row unit in Florence, Arizona:
There was nothing to hear except empty, echoing voices from other parts of the
prison. . . . There was no touch. My food was pushed through a slot. Doors were
activated by buzzers, even the one that led to a literal cage directly outside of my cell
for one hour per day of ‘recreation’. . . . Losing [human] contact, you lose your sense
of identity. You become nothing.7

Prisoners in such strictly controlled isolation may go for years “without
experiencing any form of touch beyond the chaining and unchaining of wrists
through the cuffport in the door.”8 Solitary confinement becomes “a form of
living death,” leaving inmates so separated from any social life that they are
at great risk of profound psychological distress.9
In 2011, Scott Nordstrom was entering into his fourteenth year
languishing in his segregated maximum security cell on the Arizona death
row. Into the figurative darkness of solitary incarceration (while subject
the Eighth Amendment. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (observing that “[y]ears on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price” and
suggesting that the judiciary may need to evaluate whether alternatives are workable and
constitutionally required); Porter v. Clarke, 290 F. Supp. 3d 518, 521 (E.D. Va. 2018) (holding
that long-term imposition of solitary confinement on death-row inmates violates the Eighth
Amendment). Subsequent to the events narrated above, the Arizona Department of
Corrections settled a constitutional challenge to solitary confinement, brought by Scott
Nordstrom, by allowing death row inmates to seek re-classification into close custody
conditions equivalent to those for other inmates. Stipulation and Notice of Settlement at 2,
Nordstrom v. Ryan, No. 2:15-cv-02176 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2017).
3
Complaint at 6, Nordstrom v. Ryan, No. 2:15-cv-02176 (D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 2015).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
See Brief of the Arizona Capital Representation Project as Amicus Curiae, supra note 2,
at 7.
7
Five Omar Mualimm-ak, Solitary Confinement’s Invisible Scars, THE GUARDIAN (Oct.
30, 2013).
8
LISA GUENTHER, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 164 (2013).
9
Id. at xii. See generally Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (describing the “human toll wrought by extended terms of isolation”).
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literally to constant illumination even at night)10 had come a metaphorical
ray of sunshine. With newly-discovered evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct, Nordstrom finally had reason to hope that the courts might rehear his case.
From the beginning, Scott Nordstrom had steadfastly maintained his
innocence in the murders of six people during two robberies in Tucson,
Arizona in 1996.11 His brother David Nordstrom had initially been arrested
for the murders, but immediately sought to cast the blame in another
direction.12 Later, having accepted a generous plea agreement for a short
prison term, homicide-suspect-turned-prosecution-witness David insisted
that his similar-appearing sibling Scott was the one who had committed the
crimes along with Robert Jones.13 With no fingerprint or trace evidence from
the crime scenes, David became the star witness for the prosecution in
securing a conviction and death sentence against Scott.14
At Scott Nordstrom’s trial, the prosecutor had vouched for brother
David’s alibi at the time of the second robbery as “rock solid” because he
was being electronically monitored on home arrest at night as part of his early
release from prison.15 The prosecutor represented to the jury that electronic
monitoring records showed David was home at the time of the second
robbery and that tests conducted on the monitoring system showed it could
not be defeated.16
More than a decade later, Scott Nordstrom’s claim of wrongful
conviction was given new life after the man who prosecuted him
unexpectedly died while under ethics investigation by the state bar.17 Found
in the office files of that deceased prosecutor were records that called into
question the state’s assertions that the prosecution’s lead witness, David
Nordstrom, had an air-tight alibi, including witnesses to his statements that
he regularly evaded electronic monitoring.18 The prosecutor had also
10

Brief of the Arizona Capital Representation Project as Amicus Curiae, supra note 2, at
7 (“Cells are often illuminated 24 hours a day, making it difficult for inmates to sleep.”).
11
A.J. Flick, Compromised Conviction? Death Row Inmate Scott Nordstrom Maintains
He’s Innocent and Plans an Appeal, TUCSON WKLY. (Aug. 27, 2009).
12
Id.
13
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 12–14, State v. Nordstrom, 280 P.3d 1244 (Ariz. 2012)
(No. CR-09-0266-AP); David Nordstrom’s Deal, TUCSON CITIZEN (June 5, 1997); Tucson
Nears 15th Anniversary of Killing Spree, KGUN TV (June 11, 2011).
14
Id.
15
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 13, at 12.
16
Id. at 3, 58.
17
Patty Machelor, 2nd County Prosecutor Accused of Misconduct, TUCSON CITIZEN (July
24, 2001); Flick, supra note 11.
18
Flick, supra note 11; Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 13, at 12–14.
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provided false information and concealed the suggestive procedures used by
police to elicit identification from an eyewitness.19 In addition, the
prosecutor had withheld witness reports to police indicating another party
was involved in the homicide.20 Together with other evidence and witness
information, Nordstrom hoped that his long struggle for justice might finally
attract judicial attention.21
Standing alone against the State and isolated in his segregated death row
cell, Scott Nordstrom took pen in hand to write a confidential letter to his
only ally—the court-appointed attorney for his criminal appeal from resentencing. After writing a handwritten letter sharing sensitive information,
Nordstrom put it into an envelope marked “legal mail” and addressed it to
his court-appointed lawyer.22 He handed it to a correctional officer to be
mailed, only to watch the officer proceed to read the letter.23 As later
described by a court,24 when Nordstrom objected, “the guard told him to go
pound sand” and said that he was authorized to “search the legal mail for
contraband as well as scan the content of the material to ensure it is of legal
subject matter.”25 When Nordstrom complained about this intrusion into
attorney-client communications in a prison grievance, the Director of the
Arizona Department of Corrections responded that staff are “not prohibited
from reading the mail to establish the absence of contraband and ensure the
content of the mail is of legal subject matter.”26
This interception and reading of a confidential letter to counsel occurred
during the critical stage of the direct appeal from the re-sentencing to death.27
This dispute thus arose just as Nordstrom was trying to develop a rapport
with his attorney through the exchange of highly sensitive information in an
appeal involving poignant and troubling questions of family betrayal and
prosecutorial misconduct.28 Moreover, Nordstrom found himself in the
difficult position of opposing the state’s law enforcement establishment to
accuse a prominent prosecutor of withholding evidence and presenting false
19
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 18–32, Nordstrom v. Ryan, No. CR-55947 (Ariz.
Superior Ct. June 20, 2015).
20
Id.
21
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 12–14, State v. Nordstrom, 280 P.3d 1244 (Ariz. 2012)
(No. CR-09-0266-AP); Flick, supra note 11.
22
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 906–07 (9th Cir. 2014).
23
Id. at 907.
24
Id. at 906.
25
Id. at 907.
26
Id.
27
See id.
28
See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 3–40, State v. Nordstrom, 280 P.3d 1244 (Ariz. 2012)
(No. CR-09-0266-AP).
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evidence to the jury to secure a conviction and death sentence—only to then
discover that their law enforcement brethren in the prison would be looking
over his shoulder when he wrote to his lawyer.
Any prison policy or practice of reading legal mail constitutes a
deliberate and direct intrusion by the government into the attorney-client
relationship in violation of a prisoner’s constitutionally-protected rights to
confidential communications with and effective assistance of counsel.29 Not
surprisingly, then, every federal court of appeals to address the question has
held that it is “a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights for the prison
officials to read legal mail.”30 But even as the foundations for protection of
prisoner legal mail have been fixed ever more firmly in place, some judges
remain reluctant to bar prison officials from reading the contents of legal
mail,31 and abusive interference with legal mail by prison personnel
persists.32
In this Article, we explain the vital need for confidentiality in prisoner
communications with legal counsel to avoid chilling prisoner expression and
allow lawyers to ethically and effectively represent prisoners;33 survey the
written policies of the nation’s correctional systems regarding legal mail that
respect attorney-client confidentiality;34 describe and analyze the
constitutional protections for prisoners in confidential correspondence with
lawyers through the rights of free speech, due process, access to the courts,
and assistance of counsel;35 and address the procedural steps and obstacles
for a prisoner to seek relief from the courts when that confidentiality is
breached by prison policies or practices.36
I. CONFIDENTIALITY IN ATTORNEY-CLIENT CORRESPONDENCE WITH
PRISONERS
It takes no stretch of imagination to see how an inmate would be reluctant to confide
in his lawyer about the facts of the crime, perhaps other crimes, possible plea bargains,

29
See generally Gregory C. Sisk, Legal Ethics and the Practice of Law § 4-9.12(c)(3), in
LEGAL ETHICS, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 632–33 (2018)
(discussing the interception by government of privileged communications).
30
See Lemon v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 1465, 1467 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Al-Amin v.
Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1326–32 (11th Cir. 2008) (surveying legal mail decisions); see
generally 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 12:26 (4th ed., 2012).
31
See infra notes 232–252 and accompanying text.
32
See infra notes 319–321 and accompanying text.
33
See infra Part I.
34
See infra Part II.
35
See infra Part III.
36
See infra Part IV.
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and the intimate details of his own life and his family members’ lives, if he knows that
a guard is going to be privy to them, too.37

A. ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY IN GENERAL

Confidentiality is “the cornerstone” of the attorney-client relationship.38
As attorneys, we serve as confidants in whom our clients may repose trust. If
the client were fearful of disclosure of communications, “the client would be
reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully
informed legal advice.”39 Because clients are guaranteed confidentiality,
they are willing to share their most private thoughts and relate the most
sensitive and embarrassing information, secure in the knowledge that what
has been shared will be safeguarded.
Confidentiality is necessary both to build a strong and trusting attorneyclient relationship and to ensure that the lawyer obtains the information
necessary to represent the client well. As the Supreme Court recently
reiterated, “the need for confidence” is an essential ingredient of that constitutionally-protected attorney-client relationship.40 Without such “private
consultation,” the client “does not enjoy the effective aid of counsel.”41
Intrusion by an outsider into privileged communications is demoralizing
to any ethically responsible lawyer and may discourage that lawyer from
accepting or continuing the representation. A lawyer has an ethical duty to
ensure that communications with a client are kept confidential.42
Moreover, the vital attorney-client privilege may be lost when
communications are not made in confidence.43 If a third person may intercept
the message, the communication is not in confidence and the privilege does

37

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d at 910.
Sisk, supra note 29, § 4-6.1, at 305.
39
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); see also AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION 149–50 (3rd ed. 1993) (“Without [confidentiality], the client may
withhold essential information from the lawyer. Thus, important evidence may not be
obtained, valuable defenses neglected, and, perhaps most significant, defense counsel may not
be forewarned of evidence that may be presented by the prosecution.”).
40
Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016) (plurality).
41
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d at 910 (quoting Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749,
757 (D.C. Cir. 1951)).
42
See Rule 1.6(c), MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2016) (“A lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized
access to, information relating to the representation of a client.”).
43
See generally Sisk, supra note 29, § 4-6.3(b)(4), at 322 (“The privilege is lost, or really
never comes into being, if the communication is not made in secret.”).
38
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not attach.44 Thus, for example, if a person makes statements over the phone
to his attorney while in the presence of police officers searching his
residence, those statements are admissible against him in a later criminal
case.45
As the Ethics Bureau at Yale stated in an amicus brief in the context of
confidentiality in legal mail between attorneys and prison inmates:
By forcing lawyers to violate client confidentiality, the [prison policy permitting
correctional staff to read legal mail] also precludes lawyers from fulfilling four
additional ethical duties: to communicate openly with clients, to respect clients’
autonomy, and to provide competent as well as diligent representation.46

The Yale Ethics Bureau concluded that the lawyer faced with an
irreconcilable dilemma of an unavoidable intrusion into the confidentiality
of attorney-client communications must then withdraw from the
representation.47
The lawyer’s duty to protect against the risk of interception of
confidential communications is well-illustrated by recent controversies
involving client communications through an employer’s email system. In the
past several years, several courts have denied the protection of the attorneyclient privilege to communications sent by an employee through an
employer’s computer network.48 If the company policy grants the employer
the right to access electronic messages and files, the privilege may be denied
for electronic communications between an employee and a lawyer as not
having been made in confidence.49
Responding to these cases, the American Bar Association’s Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility directs lawyers to warn
clients of the risk of sending electronic communications where there is a
44

See In re Jordan, 500 P.2d 873, 879 (Cal. 1972) (invalidating prison review of legal
mail because “letters read by mailroom guards would not be ‘confidential’ within the meaning
of [the statutory privilege] and the inmate could not claim the privilege”).
45
United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 722–23 (9th Cir. 1983).
46
Brief of the Ethics Bureau at Yale as Amicus Curiae at 3 (authored by law students
under the supervision of Lawrence Fox and Kelly A. Kszywienski), Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762
F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-15738).
47
Id. at 17–19.
48
See Gregory C. Sisk & Nicholas Halbur, A Ticking Time Bomb? University Data
Privacy Policies and Attorney-Client Confidentiality in Law School Settings, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. 1277, 1286–93; Paula Schaefer, Technology’s Triple Threat to the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 2013 PROF. LAW. 171, 176–78 (2013).
49
See, e.g., Peerenboom v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 148 A.D.3d 531 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017);
Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1107–10 (W.D. Wash. 2011);
Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 883, 893–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Scott
v. Beth Isr. Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438–41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); Kaufman v.
Sungard Inv. Sys., No. 05-CV-1236, 2006 WL 1307882, at *4 (D.N.J. May 9, 2006).
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significant risk that a third party may gain access, with specific reference to
the scenario of an employee using an employer’s computer system.50
B. ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE INMATE

The inmate is in a most vulnerable position when it comes to attorneyclient confidentiality because she is entirely dependent on the prison
establishment to confidentially transmit correspondence to and from her
counsel, allow unmonitored telephone calls with counsel, and arrange for
attorney-client meetings in a confidential setting. When, for example, an
inmate knows that correctional officers will be reading or skimming letters
to counsel, the inmate cannot be candid with the lawyer. This is especially
true when the inmate is revealing information contrary to the interests of the
government or needs to share sensitive personal information that could be
used against her by the correctional officer or others in the prison for leverage
or control or simply for teasing.
Moreover, when confidentiality is compromised by invasive prison
rules or practices, the attorney may face an ethical dilemma and could be
obliged to withdraw. Even if willing to persevere in such a representation,
the lawyer would be forced to limit the number and scope of
communications, to speak indirectly and avoid sensitive subjects, to leave
much unsaid altogether, and to discourage the client from saying or writing
anything that might be used by the opposing side.
Knowing of a prison’s refusal to respect confidentiality and faced with
awkward restrictions on communications, the client would likely lose any
remaining trust in both the lawyer and the judicial system. And the lawyer
would be deprived of information that may be helpful, even essential, to
avoid or overturn a conviction or secure a lesser sentence or to effectively
challenge abusive prison conditions. As a result, the inmate client may
actually or effectively be deprived of legal representation.
1. The Prisoner’s Need for Confidentiality in Legal Communications
A prisoner challenging the prison’s failure to provide basic medical care
should not have to submit his legal correspondence to a correctional officer
who will search its contents and evaluate whether complaints about adequate
medical care are sufficiently legal in nature. A prisoner who has been
sexually abused by a guard should not be forced to hand his letter seeking
help from his attorney to that very same guard if she is authorized to read or
skim its contents. A death row inmate challenging a wrongful conviction

50

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11–459 (2011).
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should not be required to allow agents of the State that seeks to execute him
to look over his shoulder when he writes a letter to his attorney.
In an amicus brief in a prisoner legal mail case, the Equal Justice
Initiative summarized well the necessity of confidentiality in attorney-client
legal mail for effective representation of prisoner clients in post-conviction
matters:
Confidential correspondence with prisoners serves multiple purposes. It builds trust
with clients whose prior experience with the legal system can result in distrust of
lawyers. It provides a secure outlet for people who cannot safely talk with anyone
around them about their cases. Perhaps most importantly, written correspondence
provides an efficient, inexpensive, reliable way for prisoners and their lawyers to
communicate about the myriad facts and details that are critical to building a
postconviction pleading.51

Even before a formal attorney-client relationship has been created,
correspondence by a prisoner to a lawyer may be essential to seek assistance
with a problem or by a lawyer to provide notice of prisoner rights. In
American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan v. Livingston County,52 the
Sixth Circuit firmly rejected a jail’s argument that it was required to respect
legal mail only after a prisoner designated a particular attorney as his
counsel.53
When a lawyer writes to the prisoner client, the purpose is both to fortify
the client’s emotional standing and to exchange information vital to the
representation. “It takes little more than common sense to realize that a
tender note, so important to the morale of the incarcerated individual, might
never be penned if the writer knew that it would first be scrutinized by a
guard.”54 Lawyers at the Equal Justice Initiative report that prisoner
correspondence with counsel “cover a range of topics, from case-specific
legal strategy to painful struggles with mental illness and childhood sexual
abuse, revelations of guard-on-inmate assaults, and allegations about toxic
mold in prison dorms.”55
If this information were to be disclosed, especially when provided by a
vulnerable prisoner, the correspondent could be subject to exploitation by

51

Brief of The Equal Justice Initiative as Amicus Curiae at 8 (authored by Bryan A.
Stevenson, Carla C. Crowder, and Benjamin H. Schaefer), Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903
(9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-15738).
52
796 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2015).
53
Id. at 644–45.
54
Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
55
Brief of The Equal Justice Initiative as Amicus Curiae, supra note 51, at 9.
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either fellow prisoners or by corrections officers and staff.56 And when the
inmate is challenging prison conditions or abusive conduct by prison staff,
the risk of direct retaliation would chill any inmate from communications
that are not protected by confidentiality. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed:
[P]risoners’ communications with civil attorneys often relate to lawsuits challenging
the conditions of confinement in the prison or wrongful conduct of prison employees.
When prison officials open legal mail, prisoners may justifiably be concerned about
retaliation from the very officers the prisoner has accused of wrongdoing. Prisoners
may also worry that the contents of the letters could be passed along to the facility’s
lawyers, who would learn of the prisoner’s legal strategy. 57

Even if the information is not used against the prisoner, the loss of
confidentiality impairs the attorney-client relationship and leaves the
attorney in an untenable situation. As the Ethics Bureau at Yale observed,
“it is the tangible risk, rather than actual use of confidential information by a
third party, that triggers the lawyer’s breach of the duty of
confidentiality. . . . The interception itself is the evil from which lawyers
must protect their clients.”58
The need for a free, open-ended, and confidential exchange is at its
greatest when a lawyer is representing a prisoner on death row. “From the
point of view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one
of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other legitimate state
action.”59 To ensure the scrupulous accuracy of factual findings and the legal
justifiability of a sentence of death, a capital defendant’s right to
confidentiality in communications with counsel must be protected against all
forms of interference by the State.
“Developing an effective relationship may be counsel’s most difficult
task in a capital case.”60 Indeed, the failure to effectively represent the death
penalty client is most likely to be attributable to “bad lawyering” by failing
to establish a trusting attorney-client relationship.61 As the American Bar
56

See id. at 16 (“Confidential communication is therefore critical to protect vulnerable,
younger prisoners from the repercussions of their personal histories falling into the wrong
hands.”); see also Vasquez v. Raemisch, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1140 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (noting
that if prison officials are allowed to read “sensitive legal communications,” prisoners may be
chilled in expression “out of fear of retaliation or embarrassment”).
57
Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2017).
58
Brief of the Ethics Bureau at Yale as Amicus Curiae, supra note 46, at 8.
59
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357–58 (1977).
60
Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 322 (1983).
61
American Bar Association, ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1009 (2003).
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Association guidelines for lawyers in capital cases advises, “[s]imply treating
the client with respect, listening and responding to his concerns, and keeping
him informed about the case will often go a long way towards eliciting
confidence and cooperation.”62
The sacrosanct confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship
encourages clients to share the most intimate—and perhaps painful or
embarrassing—details of their lives with their lawyers.63 And when an
individual is facing a death sentence, every aspect of the person’s life
becomes pertinent, not only in trying to establish innocence, but in parsing
out what might be considered mitigating factors for capital punishment
proceedings.64
A criminal defendant who is facing a death sentence for capital murder
must be free to share the most intimate details of his life history, safe in the
assurance that no one other than his lawyer will be able to peruse his
statements. Counsel in a capital case are directed to “engage in a continuing
interactive dialogue with the client concerning all matters that might
reasonably be expected to have a material impact on the case.”65
Moreover, death row prisoners—and indeed any vulnerable prisoner—
must be regularly evaluated to ensure an understanding of legal proceedings
and the mental health necessary to meaningfully participate in the matter. As
the Arizona Capital Representation Project explained in an amicus brief in a
legal mail case:
Critically, such monitoring frequently includes correspondence that may not appear to
a corrections officer to be strictly legal. For example, defense counsel may inquire into
her client’s sleeping habits, television watching, hobby activities, which pen pals he is
writing to, and whether he is experiencing any medical problems. Such information,
particularly when monitored consistently over a period of time, can provide the defense
team with valuable insight into the client’s daily life and whether he is experiencing
symptoms of physical or mental illness that may impact the litigation. Moreover,
inquiring about the client’s daily life is an important part of building rapport.66

62

Id.
See Brief of the Arizona Capital Representation Project as Amicus Curiae, supra note
2, at 1 (“To provide effective assistance, capital defense counsel must persuade their clients
to talk about their most horrifying and shameful personal and family experiences.”).
64
See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (holding that the sentencer must
“‘not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death;’” (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)
(plurality opinion))).
65
ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.5(C), in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 1005.
66
Brief of the Arizona Capital Representation Project as Amicus Curiae, supra note 2, at
9–10.
63
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2. The Impact of Invasive Prison Legal Mail Rules on the Availability
of Legal Counsel for Prisoners

The attorney market for prisoner cases, whether civil or criminal, is
hardly dynamic and competitive.67 As the Equal Justice Initiative explained
in an amicus brief:
As the prison population has expanded from 300,000 people in 1972 to 2.3 million
today, the resources available to incarcerated people have become increasingly
inadequate. There are very few organizations who are willing and able to provide legal
services to this population. This places a burden on existing resources that would be
unbearable without the aid of confidential communication through written
correspondence with clients.68

“Prisoner cases are particularly unpopular” and the courts rarely can
find “counsel willing to represent pro se civil rights litigants.”69 These cases
often are difficult, navigating the special procedural restrictions70 on prisoner
complaints is time-consuming and frustrating, and the prospect of
meaningful compensation is slim because “the [Prison Litigation Reform
Act] restricts the hourly rate for attorneys’ fees below market.”71
For these reasons, it is a most fortunate prisoner who is able to attract
legal representation,72 not only to provide vital litigation experience and
knowledge but also to obtain some professional imprimatur of the merits of
the case. But the lawyer who learns that the prison will not respect
confidentiality in communications with the inmate client, thus impairing the

67

See Graves v. Arpaio, 633 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (D. Ariz. 2009) (describing prisoner
case as “undesirable” because “class actions on behalf of prisoners involving the conditions
of confinement are exceedingly fact-intensive, time-consuming, and expensive to litigate, and
the [Prison Litigation Reform Act] restricts the hourly rate for attorney’s fees below market”).
68
Brief of The Equal Justice Initiative as Amicus Curiae, supra note 51, at 3.
69
LaPlante v. Pepe, 307 F. Supp. 2d 219, 223 (D. Mass. 2004); see also Kelly v. Wengler,
822 F.3d 1085, 1104 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing district court finding that, “due to the inadequacy”
of attorney’s fees, attorneys “have been unwilling to accept appointment in prisoner civil
rights cases seeking injunctive and declaratory relief”); Roger A. Hanson & Henry W.K.
Daley, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Challenging the Conditions of Prisons and Jails: A Report on
Section 1983 Litigation 21 (1994) (for Section 1983 civil rights suits, “ninety-six percent of
all prisoners proceed pro se; only four percent have counsel whether court appointed or
otherwise”), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=544 [https://per
ma.cc/65VP-DUHJ].
70
See infra Part IV.
71
Graves, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
72
See Barbara Belbot, Report on the Prison Litigation Reform Act: What Have the Courts
Decided So Far?, 84 PRISON J. 290, 302 (2004) (“The vast majority of prisoner civil rights
lawsuits are filed pro se.”).
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lawyer’s ethical responsibilities, will be discouraged from accepting that
representation.73
And, as the Supreme Court has said, “[l]awyers in criminal cases ‘are
necessities, not luxuries.’”74 That necessity becomes an imperative when the
defendant in a criminal case faces the ultimate sentence of death. Yet there
is a painful shortage of attorneys willing to provide indigent criminal defense,
and finding qualified legal representation in capital cases is especially
difficult.
As already inadequate budgets for criminal defense for poor defendants
are cut further, the number of attorneys volunteering to do such work at
poverty wages is far from robust, and willing attorneys encounter crushing
caseloads.75 A report from the American Bar Association found that
“thousands of persons are processed through America’s courts every year
either with no lawyer at all or with a lawyer who does not have the time,
resources, or in some cases the inclination to provide effective
representation.”76 The inevitable consequence is that criminal defendants are
held in jail without counsel for lengthy periods, and occasions are on the rise
for serious errors in criminal trials.77
Even fewer attorneys possess the emotional stamina and are willing and
able to devote the time and develop the expertise to represent individuals
facing the death penalty:
[T]he defense of capital cases often requires more expertise, commitment, and
resources than individual lawyers are able to offer. . . . The supply of lawyers who are
willing to make the sacrifice has never come close to satisfying the desperate needs of
the many poor who face the death penalty throughout the country today. 78

73

See infra notes 251–252 and accompanying text.
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963)).
75
See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Markus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1039–63 (2006).
76
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants,
Gideon’s Broken Promise, iv (2004), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_crimin
al_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/EK9X-5FVN].
77
See Backus & Markus, supra note 75, at 1031–34 (sharing stories of injustice due to
inadequate criminal defense).
78
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1869–70 (1994); see also Bruce A. Green,
Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433,
492–93 (1993).
74
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Defense counsel in capital cases already carry “psychological and
emotional pressures unknown elsewhere in the law.”79 For counsel in capital
cases to face intrusions into the confidential relationship by prison officials
who insist on reading the contents of legal correspondence would be frankly
demoralizing and would further discourage attorneys from undertaking this
vital work.
C. THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL MAIL TO THE ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP

Because of significant burdens on attorneys and restrictive prison rules
for personal meetings with prisoners (and especially those on death row),80
written correspondence is important to maintaining regular communication
with a prisoner. Prisons are generally not located in population centers where
lawyers have their offices.81 Attorneys willing to represent prisoners pro
bono may be located many hundreds of miles away.82 For these reasons, the
use of confidential mail correspondence is vital to effective representation
and indeed for access to legal representation at all.83
As explained in an amicus brief by the American Civil Liberties Union,
Prison Law Office, and the Arizona Center for Disability Law:
[O]rganizations that frequently represent prisoners . . . are familiar with the special
challenges in communicating with incarcerated clients. In-person visits and phone
conversations are extremely limited, and electronic mail is nonexistent. Often the best

79
Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 357 (1995).
80
Brief of the Arizona Capital Representation Project as Amicus Curiae, supra note 2, at
10 (“[I]n-person visitation is necessarily limited by the restricted legal visitation schedule,
geographic, and time constraints.”).
81
See Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 641 (7th Cir. 2015) (referring to “the rural areas
where so many prisons are located”); Phillip M. Gentry, Damage to Family Relationships as
a Collateral Consequence of Parental Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1671, 1680
(2003) (discussing the “impact upon family relationships [of prisoners] because prisons tend
to be built in remote rural locations”).
82
Brief of The Equal Justice Initiative as Amicus Curiae, supra note 51, at 15–16 (“Even
when an attorney is willing [to represent a prisoner], that attorney is often based in a location
that is hundreds of miles from the prison where their client is housed. In addition, the prison
where their client is housed may be hundreds of miles from the courthouses where the case
will be heard.”).
83
See Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2008) (describing importance
of legal mail for prisoner communication with lawyers “given their incarceration and often
distance from their attorneys”).
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and only method of communication is through the legal mail system administered by
the institution in which the client is housed.84

Even unmonitored telephone communications are no substitute for the
use of confidential correspondence between lawyers and inmates.
Confidential telephone calls with counsel typically must be arranged in
advance and are limited in time.85 Even more importantly, legal documents,
drafts of pleadings, motions and briefs, and written comments on drafts
cannot be shared by telephone.
Legal mail is essential to exchange documents and drafts and timely
receive feedback from the inmate, thereby upholding the lawyer’s ethical
duty to regularly inform and consult with the client.86 As the Ninth Circuit
has recognized, “legal representation is by nature a document-heavy
enterprise, and the contents of documents cannot always be communicated
by phone and should not always be communicated in non-privileged
email.”87
Nor are alternative means for transmittal of litigation documents
feasible. The time to arrange in-person meetings and the expense to travel to
the prison to share every document, and then to repeat that trip for every
change or comment, would soon drain away the energy of even the most
zealous attorney, deplete the resources of pro bono organizations, and make
it impossible to adhere to court briefing schedules or other timelines.88 When
a prison policy so “burdens counsel with substantially higher costs,
representational inefficiencies, and logistical difficulties, necessarily
84

Proposed Brief by American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae, Prison Law Office,
and Arizona Center for Disability Law at 5 (authored by Donald Specter and Corene
Kendrick), Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-15738).
85
Cal. Code Reg., Title 15, Div. 3, Subchapter 2, Art. 4 § 3282(g)(1) (2014)
(“Confidential calls may be approved on a case-by-case basis by the institution head or
designee, upon written request from an attorney on the attorney’s office letterhead
stationery.”); Ariz. Dep’t Corrections, Legal Access to the Courts 902.12 (providing that
“[l]egal phone calls may be approved when it is reasonable and necessary to do so” and
“should not exceed 30 minutes in length”); N.Y. Dep’t Corr. & Comm. Supervision No. 4423,
IX.B (2014) (providing that “confidential attorney legal calls” “must be requested in writing
or over the telephone by an attorney,” “the attorney must not have had a legal call with the
inmate in the past 30 days,” and “the call must not exceed 30 minutes in duration”).
86
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a) (2013) (requiring a lawyer to
“reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be
accomplished,” “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter,” and
“promptly comply with reasonable requests for information”).
87
Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2017); see also
Mangiaracina v. Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining, in a prisoner legal
mail case, that “criminal cases often involve paperwork that can only feasibly be transported
by mail”).
88
See Brief of The Equal Justice Initiative as Amicus Curiae, supra note 51, at 15-16.
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compromising the representation,” the policy unconstitutionally deprives the
inmate of the right of access to the courts.89
Even when a lawyer and prisoner-client have been able to meet in
person, follow-up correspondence remains vital to effective legal
representation. As the Ethics Bureau at Yale observed in an amicus brief:
Clients and lawyers are human. Clients often remember additional details or have new
ideas after having some time to think about a conversation with counsel, lawyers often
forget to ask a question and need to follow up, and lawyers often learn new information
or revise their thinking after the conversation, requiring another communication. If
barred from written correspondence [because of lack of confidentiality in legal mail],
the inmate’s lawyer would be forced to schedule a new call or repeat the travel process.
If time is of the essence or the client or lawyer thinks (even mistakenly) that the
information is not sufficiently critical to justify the effort, the follow up may never
occur.90

Finally, a prison policy that would deny confidentiality to
correspondence while supposedly conferring it for in-person meetings would
be perplexing. The special setting of a meeting between a lawyer and an
inmate imposes greater burdens and security risks for prison staff, while legal
correspondence is comparatively innocuous.91 If confidentiality truly were
guaranteed, meetings and telephone calls pose at least as much risk of
transmitting whatever it is that a prison would wish to intercept by reading
or scanning legal mail. As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit has said, a prisoner’s “use of the mail to communicate
confidentially with attorneys about his cases is not inconsistent with his

89

Brief of the Ethics Bureau at Yale as Amicus Curiae, supra note 46, at 8 (citing
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 420 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989), as overturning a prison policy that prevented lawyers from
having other employees conduct client interviews, and thus effectively required lawyers to
meet with clients in person on every occasion, because the policy “imposed a substantial
burden on the right of access to the courts”).
90
Brief of the Ethics Bureau at Yale as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant
and in Favor of Reversal at 12 (authored by law students under the supervision of Lawrence
Fox and Kelly A. Kszywienski), Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 1615277).
91
See generally Chesa Boudin, Trevor Stutz & Aaron Littman, Prison Visitation Policies:
A Fifth-State Survey, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 160–67 (2013) (describing prison policies
to ensure security for in-person visits to inmates, including limitations on number and timing
of visits, restricting eligibility based on security classification, requiring advance approval of
visitors, and searching visitors); see also Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 749 (5th Cir. 1977)
(observing that prison officials have “a duty to adopt reasonable measures to prevent visitors
from smuggling weapons or contraband to prisoners, whether the prisoners are convicted or
unconvicted and whether they are classified as maximum or minimum security risks”).
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prisoner status or with legitimate penological objectives, but promotes the
state’s interest in institutional order and security.”92
II. A SURVEY OF PRISON POLICIES ON LEGAL MAIL
When evaluating whether prison security interests demonstrate “the
need for a particular type of restriction,” the Supreme Court has advised that
“[w]hile not necessarily controlling, the policies followed at other well-run
institutions would be relevant.”93
With rare and constitutionally dubious exceptions,94 the formal written
policies of correctional departments across the nation protect the
confidentiality of the contents of attorney-client mail. These policies
countenance no reading of either incoming or outgoing legal mail. And
outgoing legal mail generally is subject to minimal inspection, given that the
risk of contraband leaving the institution is far lower than the risk of its
introduction into a correctional facility.95

92

Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008).
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414 n.14 (1974); see also Warsoldier v. Woodford,
418 F.3d 989, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that other states, while having “the same
compelling interest in maintaining prison security, ensuring public safety, and protecting
inmate health,” had less restrictive policies that did not infringe on a prisoner’s religious
liberty).
94
Only three states appear to allow significant access to the substantive contents of
confidential attorney-client mail. One of those policies has been overturned in court as
unconstitutional. For discussion of Arizona’s policy to read or skim the contents of a prisoner’s
outgoing legal mail and the successful constitutional challenge to that policy, see infra Part
III.D.3.c. Although Minnesota specifies that outgoing legal mail may not be read, the policy
permits prison staff to “skim the contents to ensure that it is legal/official in nature.” Minn.
Dep’t of Corr. Policies, Directives & Instructions Manual 302.020 (2018). The North Carolina
prison policy authorizes correctional staff to “ensure that the contents of letters from these
persons are free of contraband and are, in fact, official or legal correspondence from the person
whose name and return address appears on the outside of the envelope or package,” but the
policy cautions that “[t]he correspondence shall not be read beyond what is necessary to make
this determination.” North Carolina Dep’t of Pub. Safety Div. of Prisons, Policy & Proc.,
Chapter D, Section 0.310(b) (2012). These policies are vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
As discussed later, skimming of legal mail for substantive contents is as destructive of
confidentiality as reading. See infra Part III.D.3.a.
95
For the reader’s convenience, in an appendix available online, we have set forth the
sources for, description of, and internet links to the policies of the federal Bureau of Prisons
and state correctional departments regarding treatment of mail between prisoners and counsel.
See Appendix: Federal Bureau of Prisons and State Corrections Department Policies on
Prisoner Attorney-Client Legal Mail (Revised July 2018), personal.stthomas.edu/GCSISK/
Appendix.Legal.Mail.Policies.docx [https://perma.cc/6CRM-7Z6R].
93
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A. PRISON REGULATIONS ON INCOMING ATTORNEY MAIL TO
PRISONERS

The federal Bureau of Prisons and some thirty-one state correctional
departments expressly prohibit the reading of legal mail (at least without
probable cause to believe the correspondence is a threat to facility security or
involves criminal activity).96 Several more state departments implicitly or
effectively prohibit reading by carefully limiting any inspection to discovery
of contraband.97
For example, absent “specific circumstances or specific information”
about illegal conduct or threats to security, Oregon provides that legal mail
may be “examined for contraband in the presence of the inmate, but shall not
be read or photocopied.”98 Iowa expressly declares that “[c]onfidential mail
may be read only after a finding of probable cause by a court of competent
jurisdiction that a threat to the order and security of the institution or abuse
of correspondence exists.”99
While several states permit prison officials to inspect the contents of
incoming legal mail in some limited way,100 they do not appear to allow
actual reading of the correspondence, which would be constitutionally
troubling.101 Some of these states do attempt to restrict the inspection in a
manner that mitigates the invasion and minimizes the chance that the
substantive contents will be reviewed. Florida, for example, states that
“[o]nly the signature and letterhead may be read,” presumably to confirm that
an attorney is the source.102
96

Id.
Id.
98
Or. Dept. of Corr., Division 131 Mail (Inmate), 291-131-0030 (2008).
99
Iowa Admin. Code 201-20.4 (2010); see also Maine Dep’t of Corr. Chapter 21: Prisoner
Communication, 21.2, at VI(D) (2016) (providing that incoming legal mail may be read only
if “there is probable cause to believe that the correspondence is being used to plan or conduct
criminal activity, e.g., contains threats, obscene language or pictures, or escape or assault
plans”); Virginia Dep’t of Corr. Operating Proc. 803.1, at IV.C.1.d.iii (2017) (observing that
“[r]eading of most types of legal mail require Court approval based upon specified probable
cause to believe that a state or federal criminal statute is being violated, or that there exists a
valid threat to the security of the facility”). Other prison regulations permit access to the
contents of legal mail based on “reasonable suspicion” that unlawful material is included. See,
e.g., Illinois Dep’t Corr. Mail Procedures, 20 Ill. Adm. Code 525.130 (2003); Nevada Dep’t
of Corr. Admin. Reg. 722.08–.10, Inmate Legal Access (2016); Tennessee Admin. Policies &
Proc., Inmate Mail, Index No. 507.02, at VI.C, K (2017).
100
See Appendix, supra note 95.
101
See infra Part III.D.3.
102
Fla. Admin. Code, Legal Documents and Legal Mail, 33-210.102(8)(d) (2012); see
also 28 C.F.R. § 540.18 (2009) (“The correspondence may not be read or copied if the sender
is adequately identified on the envelope, and the front of the envelope is marked ‘Special
97
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B. PRISON REGULATIONS ON OUTGOING PRISONER MAIL TO
ATTORNEYS

Consistent with the Supreme Court’s observation that a prison’s security
concerns regarding outgoing mail are of a “categorically lesser
magnitude,”103 the federal Bureau of Prisons and a growing majority (now
twenty-eight) of State correctional departments allow prisoners to send
outgoing legal mail without it being subsequently opened or inspected by
prison personnel, absent some individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.104
As an example from the state with the largest prison population, the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice directs: “In order to facilitate the
attorney-client privilege, an offender may send sealed and uninspected letters
directly to legal correspondents. No correspondence from an offender to any
legal correspondent shall be opened or read.”105
While some states do authorize a “scan” or “inspection” of outgoing
legal mail, such correctional policies typically provide that outgoing legal
mail may be inspected for contraband, but without reviewing the text of the
correspondence.106 As a prominent example, California—which has the
second largest prison population in the nation—directs that, when outgoing

Mail— Open only in the presence of the inmate.’”); Ky. Corr. Policies and Procs. 16.2, at
C(3), Inmate Correspondence (2014) (“Incoming privileged mail shall not be read if the sender
is adequately identified on the envelope and the purpose of the mail is not an issue in
determining whether it should be considered privileged mail.”).
103
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989).
104
See generally Appendix, supra note 95; see, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 540.18(c)(1)
(“[O]utgoing special mail may be sealed by the inmate and is not subject to inspection,”); Del.
Dep’t of Corr. Policy Manual, Ch. 4, § 4.0, IV.D.2 (2015) (“Outgoing legal/privileged mail
will be recorded and shall not be opened for inspection or any other purpose or otherwise
impeded in its transmission,” if “properly addressed and marked and passing a fluoroscope
examination.”); 20 Ill. Adm. Code 525.130(c), (d) (2003) (“Outgoing mail which is clearly
marked as privileged and addressed to a privileged party may not be opened for inspection”
absent reasonable suspicion of contraband); N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & Community Supervision,
Privileged Correspondence No. 4421, 7 NYCRR 721.3, III.A.2, C (2014) (“Outgoing
privileged correspondence may be sealed by an inmate, and such correspondence shall not be
opened, inspected, or read without express written authorization by the facility
Superintendent” supported by facts giving reason to believe the law has been violated or safety
endangered).
105
Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Uniform Offender Correspondence Rules, BP-03.91,
III.A (2013).
106
See Colo. Dep’t of Corr. Admin. Regulation 300-38 (IV.D) (2015) (providing that
prisoners may “send sealed letters” to counsel, subject only to an inspection for contraband
before being sealed”); S.D. Corr. Policy, 1.5.D.3, at IV.6.C (2015) (authorizing inspection
only to “prevent the movement of contraband”).
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legal mail is inspected for contraband, prison staff are directed to “remove
the contents of the envelope upside down to prevent reading.”107
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRISONER-ATTORNEY
CORRESPONDENCE
[T]here has been widespread agreement that communications by post between an
inmate and his attorney are sacrosanct, subject only to tests on incoming mail for the
presence of contraband which fall short of opening it when the inmate is not present.108

Every federal circuit to address the question has concluded that it is “a
violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights for the prison officials to read
legal mail.”109 As the leading treatise on prisoner rights summarizes, “the
courts have almost universally agreed that it is not constitutional to read an
inmate’s legal mail or open it outside of an inmate’s presence.”110
Protecting the confidentiality of legal mail ensures that “the inmate’s
correspondence with his attorney is not inhibited or chilled by his fear that
this correspondence may be read by prison officials.”111 In addition, the only
effective protection against abuse by state officials in appropriating and
misusing confidential attorney-client information is to preclude access to the
contents of legal mail by anyone outside the attorney-client relationship.112
Moreover, the prisoner’s interest in “unimpaired, confidential
communications with an attorney is an integral component of the judicial
process.”113 And, “a critical component of the right of access to the courts
[is], namely the opportunity to receive privileged communications from
counsel.”114
Most courts have grounded the right in the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment or the right of access to the courts under the Due Process

107

Cal. Code Reg., tit. 15, § 3142 (2014).
Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 631 (7th Cir. 1973).
109
Lemon, 931 F.2d at 1467; see also Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir.
2014); Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008). On the prohibition of reading
of prisoner-attorney correspondence, see generally Part III.D.1 infra.
110
MUSHLIN, supra note 30, § 12:26.
111
Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1331; see also Vasquez v. Raemisch, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1140
(W.D. Wis. 2007); see generally Part I supra.
112
See Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1123–24, 1131 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding
injunction against prison officials when a prison employee made a copy of a letter from a
lawyer to inmates summarizing the strength of their claims and shared it with lead counsel for
the defendant state department).
113
Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2003).
114
Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1133.
108
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.115 The Seventh Circuit in GuajardoPalma v. Martinson116 opined that “since the purpose of confidential
communication with one’s lawyer is to win a case rather than to enrich the
marketplace of ideas, it seems more straightforward to base the concern with
destroying that confidentiality on the right of access to the courts . . . .”117 By
contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Al-Amin v. Smith, in holding that a prisoner
has “a First Amendment free speech right to communicate with his attorneys
by mail, separate and apart from his constitutional right to access to the
courts,” believed that “given their incarceration and often distance from their
attorneys, prisoners’ use of the mail to communicate with their attorneys
about their criminal cases may frequently be a more important free speech
right than the use of their tongues.”118
While a lower court may occasionally deprecate a prisoner’s First
Amendment right to confidential correspondence with a lawyer by observing
that the attorney-client privilege is not a constitutional rule,119 that argument
largely misses the point. To be sure, the common-law evidentiary attorneyclient privilege, with all of its elements, definition, and exceptions, has not
been incorporated into constitutional law.120 But the fundamental principle
of confidentiality in communication with legal counsel, which underlies the
attorney-client privilege as well, has a strong purchase on the First
Amendment. Because confidentiality is at the core of the attorney-client
relationship, that constitutionally-protected relationship cannot go forward

115

See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Interference with legal mail
implicates a prison inmate’s rights to access to the courts and free speech as guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.”); see also Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at
1333-34; Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d at 909 & n.2 (describing courts analyzing
confidentiality of prisoner-attorney correspondence under the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech and the Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and access to the
courts “or some combination of these rights”). On free speech and right of access to court
rulings, see generally Part III.A infra.
116
622 F.3d at 801 (7th Cir. 2010).
117
Id. at 802.
118
Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1333–34.
119
Toevs v. Quinn, No. 15-cv-02838-RBJ, 2017 WL 1055314, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 21,
2017) (rejecting a prisoner’s First Amendment claim based directly on breach of the attorneyclient privilege).
120
See Howell v. Trammell, 728 F.3d 1202, 1222 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[S]tanding alone, the
attorney-client privilege is merely a rule of evidence; it has not yet been held a constitutional
right.”); Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege
constitutes an evidentiary privilege that is secured by state law, and not by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.”); Guajardo-Palma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d at 802 (“Not that the
lawyer-client privilege is constitutional”).
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without it.121 As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, “[b]ecause the
maintenance of confidentiality in attorney-client communications is vital to
the ability of an attorney to effectively counsel her client, interference with
this confidentiality impedes the client’s First Amendment right to obtain
legal advice.”122
Although the substance of the right to confidentiality in prisoner legal
mail appears to be the same under both the Free Speech and Due Process
Clauses, the source of the right may matter greatly in terms of the showing
that must be made by the prisoner to have standing. As discussed in a
subsequent part of this Article, a prisoner claiming an interference with his
right of access to the courts under the Due Process Clause must establish an
“actual injury” by showing that his pursuit of litigation was thereby
impeded.123 By contrast, the courts have held that a prisoner need not show
injury beyond the invasion of the free speech right to maintain an action
under the Free Speech Clause.124
An even more robust right to confidentiality in prisoner-attorney
correspondence should attach when the prisoner is defending against a
criminal charge or seeking to overturn a wrongful conviction or sentence.
Because “[a] criminal defendant’s ability to communicate candidly and
confidentially with his lawyer is essential to his defense,” “the right to
privately confer with counsel is nearly sacrosanct.”125 Accordingly, the
courts also agree that, when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches
in a criminal case, a prisoner’s confidential correspondence with counsel may
not be deliberately invaded by officials of the state, which of course includes
prison officials.126

121
See Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 611 (9th Cir. 2005) (ruling
that the “right to hire and consult an attorney” is protected by the First Amendment).
122
Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir. 2000).
123
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). On the “actual injury” requirement as
required for claims of access to the courts involving legal mail, see Part IV.C.4 infra.
124
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 2017); Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d
1317, 1333–35 (11th Cir. 2008); Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 359–60 (3d Cir. 2006). On
the requirements for standing for a free speech claim involving legal mail, see Part IV.C.2
infra.
125
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2014).
126
Id. at 909–11; Guajardo-Palma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2010);
Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307, 317–19 (6th Cir. 2009). On the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, see generally Part III.A infra.
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A. PRISONER FREE SPEECH AND ACCESS TO COURT RIGHTS TO
CONFIDENTIALITY IN ATTORNEY CORRESPONDENCE

1. Supreme Court Precedent
In Wolff v. McDonnell,127 decided in 1974, the Supreme Court addressed
a case that began as a challenge to a prison policy allowing prison officials
to read all incoming mail, including that clearly marked as from attorneys.
By the time the Wolff case reached the Supreme Court, however, prison
officials had abandoned that intrusive policy and “concede[d] that they
cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates.”128 The Court
approved a revised prison policy that prohibited prison officials from reading
such legal mail, but allowed the mail to be opened in the prisoner’s presence
to inspect for contraband.129 In response to the prisoners’ continuing
concerns that the policy interfered with their constitutional rights, the Court
observed:
As to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way
constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such
communications, since the inmate’s presence insures that prison officials will not read
the mail.130

The Supreme Court has not retreated from Wolff over the past four
decades.
Subsequently, in the context of incoming non-legal mail, the Supreme
Court qualified earlier decisions that had suggested a standard of “strict” or
“heightened” scrutiny for prison regulations implicating First Amendment
rights, rather than a reasonableness standard, while affirming that prison
concerns with outgoing mail remain of a “categorically lesser magnitude.”131
In Thornburgh v. Abbott, decided in 1989, the Court directed that the
reasonableness standards for evaluating prison penological interests against
prisoner constitutional rights articulated in Turner v. Safley132 should be
applied to prison regulations restricting incoming publications.133 Because
the entry of materials into a prison poses greater threats to prison security,
the Court afforded prison officials greater discretion in formulating policies
affecting incoming mail.134
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Id. at 575 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 576–77.
Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989).
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413.
Id.
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However, the Thornburgh Court held, regulations pertaining to
outgoing mail demand a “closer fit between the regulation and the purpose it
serves” because departing correspondence from prisoners does not “by its
very nature, pose a serious threat to prison order and security.”135 Because
“[t]he implications of outgoing correspondence for prison security are of a
categorically lesser magnitude than the implications of incoming
materials,”136 the Supreme Court adhered to the standard for outgoing mail
articulated earlier in Procunier v. Martinez.137
In sum, for outgoing inmate mail—even non-legal outgoing mail—a
prison regulation must further “an important or substantial governmental
interest” and “the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater
than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental
interest involved.”138 Procunier remains the controlling Supreme Court law
on regulation of outgoing prisoner mail.139
2. Circuit Precedent (Majority)
Courts naturally are “concerned about [prison officials] reading the
prisoner’s correspondence with his lawyer,” because it would be “like a
litigant’s eavesdropping on conferences between his opponent and the
opponent’s lawyer.”140 As the Second Circuit summarized in Davis v.
Goord,141 “[i]n balancing the competing interests implicated in restrictions
on prison mail, courts have consistently afforded greater protection to legal
mail than to non-legal mail, as well as greater protection to outgoing mail
than to incoming mail.”142 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Wolff,
“lower courts have drawn the line pretty much where the court in Wolff did,
balking at permitting the reading of inmate-attorney mail or the opening of it
outside the presence of the inmate.”143

135

Id. at 411–12; see also Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Thornburgh for the proposition that “[w]hen a prison regulation affects outgoing mail as
opposed to incoming mail, there must be a ‘closer fit between the regulation and the purpose
it serves’”).
136
Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413.
137
416 U.S. 396 (1974).
138
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413.
139
Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Procunier is controlling
law in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere as applied to claims involving outgoing prisoner
mail.”).
140
Guajardo-Palma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 802 (7th Cir. 2010).
141
320 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 2003).
142
Id. at 351.
143
MUSHLIN, supra note 30, § 12:26.
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Two years before Wolff, the First Circuit recognized the right of inmates
to be present when their legal mail is opened because “the prisoner has a right
to have the confidence between himself and his counsel totally respected.”144
After Wolff, eight additional circuits followed suit in protecting the prisoner’s
right of confidentiality in legal mail, mostly on free speech or access to the
courts grounds.145
As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Al-Amin v. Smith, “opening mail
in an inmate’s presence ‘insures that prison officials will not read the mail’
and thus does not chill attorney-inmate communication.”146 Similarly, in
Jones v. Brown, the Third Circuit stated that “‘the only way to ensure that
mail is not read when opened . . . is to require that it be done in the presence
of the inmate to whom it is addressed.’”147
In addition to those decisions ensuring opening of legal mail in the
prisoner’s presence on First Amendment grounds, the Ninth Circuit has
affirmed the same rule in the context of criminal representation under the
Sixth Amendment. In Mangiaracina v. Penzone,148 the Ninth Circuit
“clarif[ied]” that “prisoners have a Sixth Amendment right to be present
when legal mail related to a criminal matter is inspected.”149 To the jail’s
protest that the prisoner had not alleged that officials who opened his mail
had actually read it, the court countered:
But indeed, how could he? If the practice of opening legal mail in the presence of the
prisoner is designed to prevent correctional officers from reading it, then the natural
corollary is that a prisoner whose mail is opened outside his presence has no way of
knowing whether it had been (permissibly) inspected or (impermissibly) read.150

144

Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696, 697 (1st Cir. 1972).
Davis, 320 F.3d at 352; Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2006); Jones v.
Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 267 (6th Cir. 2009); Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 686 (7th
Cir. 2005); Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1182–83 (8th Cir. 1981); Nordstrom v. Ryan,
856 F.3d 1265, 1271–73 (9th Cir. 2017) (First and Sixth Amendment); Nordstrom v. Ryan,
762 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2014) (Sixth Amendment); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 582
(10th Cir. 1980); Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1330–32 (11th Cir. 2008).
146
Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1332 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974))
(emphasis in original); see also Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The
policy that incoming confidential legal mail should be opened in inmates’ presence . . . serves
the prophylactic purpose of assuring them that confidential attorney-client mail has not been
improperly read in the guise of searching for contraband.”); Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849
F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e recognize that prisoners have a protected First
Amendment interest in having properly marked legal mail opened only in their presence.”).
147
Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d at 359 (citation omitted).
148
849 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2017).
149
Id. at 1196.
150
Id. at 1197.
145
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3. Circuit Precedent (Minority)

Although a minority of circuits allow somewhat greater leeway to
prison officials to inspect attorney-client mail, no circuit has approved a
direct invasion into the confidentiality of legal mail by allowing prison
authorities to read such correspondence.
Alone among the circuits, the Fifth Circuit held in Brewer v.
Wilkinson,151 that prison officials did not violate rights to free speech and
access to the courts by opening incoming legal mail outside of the prisoner’s
presence.152 Treating the Brewer decision as an “anomaly,”153 other circuits
continue to hold that a prison practice of opening properly marked incoming
legal mail outside the inmate’s presence violates the Constitution.154
In any event, although “incoming legal mail was opened and inspected
for contraband outside [the prisoner’s] presence,”155 prison officials in
Brewer were not alleged to have actually read the attorney-client
correspondence. Indeed, a student law review article defending Brewer’s
allowance of inspection of incoming legal mail in the prison mailroom
acknowledged that “a prison mail clerk would certainly violate an inmate’s
rights by censoring or reading the legal mail.”156
And, importantly, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the prisoner’s
“claim regarding outgoing legal mail poses a different question.”157 Because
the Supreme Court has held that a prison’s penological interests regarding
outgoing mail are of a “categorically lesser magnitude,”158 the Brewer Court
reversed summary judgment against the prisoner’s constitutional claims that
his outgoing legal mail was censored by the removal of legal material.159
The closest any circuit has come to condoning the actual reading of legal
mail by prison officials—and it is not at all close—might be the Sixth Circuit
in Bell-Bey v. Williams.160 The court there held that requiring a prisoner to
151

3 F.3d 816 (5th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 825.
153
Aaron C. Lapin, Are Prisoners’ Rights to Legal Mail Lost Within the Prison Gates?,
33 NOVA L. REV. 703, 727 (2009).
154
See, e.g., Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317,1330–31 (11th Cir. 2008); Bieregu v.
Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1458 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds, Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343 (1996).
155
Brewer, 3 F.3d at 825.
156
Michael Kummer, Note, Pushing the Envelope of Prisoners’ Rights: Legal Mail and
the Right of Access to the Courts, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1195, 1195 (2009).
157
Brewer, 3 F.3d at 825 (emphasis in original).
158
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989).
159
Brewer, 3 F.3d at 825–26.
160
87 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 1996).
152
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prove the legal nature of a letter after exhausting his monthly postal allotment
did not overburden his First Amendment rights.161 As that court repeatedly
emphasized, a prisoner under that policy could avoid any inspection of
correspondence to lawyers by either holding to his allotment of ten stamps
per month or by simply paying for the postage himself.162
Moreover, even in the limited context of a prisoner who had used up his
postal allotment, the prison regulation reviewed in Bell-Bey tightly controlled
the discretion of the reviewing staff member to look for identifiable legal
information such as docket numbers or case titles and most assuredly did “not
authorize prison employees to ‘read’ the prisoner’s legal mail.” 163 Indeed,
the Sixth Circuit agreed that “[i]f the policy [permitted prison officials to read
legal mail], it could chill a prisoner’s free expression, communication with
counsel, or access to the courts for fear his jailer reads the contents.”164
4. Whether Prison Intrusion Occurs Inside or Outside Presence of
Prisoner as Being Irrelevant to Prohibition on Reading
The constitutional right at issue here is the prisoner’s “use of the mail
to communicate confidentially with attorneys about his cases.”165 The
constitutional wrong comes with the breach of that confidentiality through
the reading of legal mail by prison personnel. Nothing turns on where this
wrong occurs, whether inside or outside the presence of the prisoner. If
anything, a prisoner who must watch a corrections officer read his legal mail
in front of him—which the prisoner inevitably experiences as taunting—is
even more likely to be chilled from future attempts at confidential
correspondence.
In the Ninth Circuit case of Nordstrom v. Ryan,166 the State of Arizona
presented the decidedly novel thesis that a constitutional violation occurs
only “when officials read the prisoner’s mail outside his presence, while the
officer [in this case] read [the prisoner’s] letter in his presence.”167 In other
words, Arizona contended that the Constitution is offended only when a
prison official reads a prisoner’s letter to counsel outside of his presence, but

161

Id. at 839–40.
Id. at 837, 839.
163
Id. at 835.
164
Id. at 839.
165
Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008).
166
762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014).
167
Brief of the State of Arizona as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 2,
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-15738).
162
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that the Constitution imposes no bar when a prison official reads the same
letter in the prisoner’s presence.168
No federal court of appeals has approved the actual reading of a
prisoner’s legal mail, whether in or out of the prisoner’s presence. Indeed,
the Eleventh Circuit in Lemon v. Dugger169 recognized the “constitutional
right not to have [a prisoner’s legal] mail read” in a case where the prison
official read an attorney’s letter in the presence of the prisoner to whom it
was addressed.170 Moreover, Arizona’s argument turned the extensive legal
mail case-law on its head, as the judicial direction for “opening mail in an
inmate’s presence ‘insures that prison officials will not read the mail’ and
thus . . . not chill attorney-inmate communication.”171
The Third Circuit’s decision in Jones v. Brown172 is illustrative. In that
case, the prison policy specifically prohibited prison staff from reading or
censoring the contents of legal correspondence.173 And yet the prison’s
intrusion into the contents of the legal mail by inspecting it in the prison
mailroom defeated the assurance of confidentiality and discouraged prisoners
from engaging in correspondence with counsel:
A state pattern and practice, or, as is the case here, explicit policy, of opening legal mail
outside the presence of the addressee inmate interferes with protected communications,
strips those protected communications of their confidentiality, and accordingly
impinges upon the inmate’s right to freedom of speech. The practice deprives the
expression of confidentiality and chills the inmates’ protected expression, regardless of
the state’s good-faith protestations that it does not, and will not, read the content of the
communications. This is so because “the only way to ensure that mail is not read when
opened . . . is to require that it be done in the presence of the inmate to whom it is
addressed.”174

The Arizona prison policy challenged in the Nordstrom case in the
Ninth Circuit presented a much more direct and egregious violation of
prisoner constitutional rights than did the New Jersey policy struck down in
Jones v. Brown. The Third Circuit invalidated a prison’s policy of opening
legal mail outside the presence of the prison because of the risk that
confidential legal mail would be read.175 In the Nordstrom case, that risk had
exploded into a reality.
168

Id. at 2, 15–16.
931 F.2d 1465, 1468 (11th Cir. 1991).
170
Id. at 1468.
171
Al-Amin, 511 F.3d at 1332 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974)
(emphasis in original).
172
461 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2006).
173
Id. at 357.
174
Id. at 359 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576–77).
175
Id.
169
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The Ninth Circuit rejected Arizona’s claimed power to read a death row
inmate’s legal mail as long it was read in his presence, observing that Arizona
“fail[ed] to explain how that practice ameliorates the chilling effect likely to
result from an inmate’s knowledge that every word he writes to his lawyer
may be intercepted by prison guards and possibly used against him.”176
B. PRISONER RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN ATTORNEY
CORRESPONDENCE
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to assistance of
counsel, which includes the right to confer privately with that counsel. State intrusion
into those private conversations is a blatant violation of a foundational right. We
strongly condemn “the odious practice of eavesdropping on privileged communication
between attorney and client.”177

Because most cases involving interference by prison officials with legal
mail have not involved direct criminal proceedings, the courts have seldom
had occasion to address the full implications of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.178 Nonetheless, the courts agree that a “practice of prison officials
reading mail between a prisoner and his lawyer in a criminal case would raise
serious issues under the Sixth Amendment (and its application, by
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, to state criminal defendants),
which guarantees a right to counsel in criminal cases.”179 And the Ninth
Circuit, in Nordstrom v. Ryan,180 has expressly grounded its holding that
prison officials may not read a prisoner’s confidential letter to his attorney
on the Sixth Amendment, given that the prisoner involved was a death row
inmate whose sentence was on direct appeal.181 Likewise, the protective
measure of requiring incoming mail from an attorney to be opened only in
176

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2014).
State v. Fuentes, 318 P.3d 257, 258 (Wash. 2014) (quoting State v. Cory, 382 P.2d
1019, 1023 (Wash. 1963)).
178
See, e.g., Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1454 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that, because the
prisoner failed to indicate that opened legal mail involved a criminal proceeding, “we will
explore plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment claim no further”), abrogated on other grounds, Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Alvarez v. Horel, 415 Fed. App’x 836, 837 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“The district court properly dismissed [prisoner’s] claim that defendant [correctional officer]
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by opening his legal mail because the Sixth
Amendment applies only to criminal proceedings.”).
179
Guajardo-Palma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307, 317–19 (6th Cir. 2009) (denying qualified immunity
because prison officials were on notice that “opening properly marked legal mail alone,
without doing more,” implicated the Sixth Amendment).
180
762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014).
181
Id. at 909–11.
177
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the prisoner’s presence has been affirmed under the Sixth Amendment,
parallel to the same requirement in civil representation under the First
Amendment.182
“Once an accused has a lawyer, a distinct set of constitutional
safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship
takes effect.”183 In Wolff v. McDonnell,184 the Supreme Court described the
Sixth Amendment right for prisoners as designed to “protect the attorneyclient relationship from intrusion in the criminal setting.”185 Accordingly,
“[w]hen the government deliberately interferes with the confidential
relationship between a criminal defendant and defense counsel, that
interference violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if it substantially
prejudices the criminal defendant.”186
An incarcerated prisoner retains the fundamental right to a confidential
attorney-client relationship. As the Supreme Court stated a half century ago,
“even in a jail, or perhaps especially there, the relationships which the law
has endowed with particularized confidentiality must continue to receive
unceasing protection.”187 Accordingly, the American Bar Association’s
Standards for Criminal Justice provide that “[p]ersonnel of jails, prisons, and
custodial institutions should be prohibited by law or administrative
regulations from examining or otherwise interfering with any communication
or correspondence between client and defense counsel relating to legal action
arising out of charges or incarceration.”188
In Nordstrom v. Ryan, the Ninth Circuit joined other circuits in
prohibiting the reading of prisoner legal mail to attorneys and did so in a case
that “f[e]ll squarely within the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.”189 Reaffirming that “‘an accused does not enjoy the effective aid
of counsel if he is denied the right of private consultation with him,’” the
court characterized the right of confidential communications by a criminal
defendant with his lawyer as “nearly sacrosanct.”190 Because reading by
prison officials of an inmate’s letters to counsel “is highly likely to inhibit
the sort of candid communications that the right to counsel and the attorney182

Mangiaracina v. Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2017).
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988).
184
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
185
Id. at 576.
186
Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 584–85 (9th Cir.2004).
187
Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143–44 (1962).
188
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function, Standard 43.1(c) (3d ed. 1993).
189
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2014).
190
Id. at 910 (quoting Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1951)).
183
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client privilege are meant to protect,” the court held that “the Constitution
does not permit . . . reading outgoing attorney-client correspondence.”191
Moreover, we are talking here not only about convicted criminal
defendants who are in prison after trial or plea and sentencing, but also those
who are being detained prior to trial and who have not yet been found guilty
of any crime. As the New York County Lawyers Association and the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers reminded in an amicus
brief, “roughly half a million people in jail are pretrial at any given time,”
with high percentages of city and county jail beds being occupied by pretrial
detainees, from 71 percent in California to 74 percent in Phoenix, Arizona
and up to 85 percent in New York City.192
The Supreme Court has not extended the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to post-conviction proceedings, although the Court observed that
when a prisoner’s first opportunity to raise an issue, such as ineffective
assistance of counsel, comes only after a direct appeal, “the collateral
proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct appeal as to
the ineffective-assistance claim.”193
Still, while there may be no
constitutional right to appointment of counsel for post-conviction
proceedings, “[t]here is, however, a right to due process.”194 Whatever may
be the parameters of the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process in postconviction proceedings, it surely must include the right to be free from
deliberate government intrusion into confidential letters between an inmate
and his attorney challenging a criminal conviction or sentence.
C. PROTECTING A PRISON’S LEGITIMATE PENOLOGICAL INTERESTS
[A prisoner’s] use of the mail to communicate confidentially with attorneys about his
cases is not inconsistent with his prisoner status or with legitimate penological
objectives, but promotes the state’s interest in institutional order and security. 195

As discussed above,196 the federal courts of appeals have uniformly
found that prisons fail to raise any penological interest sufficient to justify
the extraordinary step of reading a prisoner’s legal mail to his attorney.
Moreover, as discussed immediately below, ample alternative means for

191

Id. (emphasis in original).
Brief of N.Y. Cty. Lawyers Ass’n & Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Defense Lawyers as Amici
Curiae at 26–27 (authored by Elliott Dolby Shields and Robin E. Wechkin), Nordstrom v.
Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-15277).
193
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).
194
Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1993).
195
Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008).
196
See supra Part III.A & B.
192
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security are available to the prison that do not require invasion into the
substantive contents of attorney-client correspondence.
1. Protecting Against Introduction of Contraband
The prison’s need to protect against contraband being introduced into
the prison is legitimate and certainly justifies appropriate protective steps. In
this same respect, as discussed above,197 the Supreme Court and the
substantial majority of corrections systems in the country recognize that the
security concerns with respect to outgoing mail are minimal. Indeed, in the
federal and many state corrections systems, a prisoner may submit outgoing
legal mail already sealed for transmittal by the prison without further
inspection.198 After all, common sense tells us that the problem typically is
with contraband being mailed into—not out of—the prison.
In any event, whether we are addressing incoming or outgoing legal
mail, as the Sixth Circuit remarked in Reneer v. Sewell,199 “it is difficult to
understand why prison officials would ever have to read an inmate’s legal
mail in search of such ‘contraband.’”200 Especially because “attorneys are
unlikely to send contraband,”201 a prison has no legitimate basis to go beyond
physical inspection for contraband—a justification that diminishes even
further with respect to outgoing mail.
Most courts view the protections against opening and reading of legal
mail as appropriately limited to correspondence to or from a specifically
named licensed attorney when the envelope is clearly marked as privileged
and confidential.202 The federal courts of appeals are divided on what
additional steps may be imposed that could compromise confidentiality but
protect against incoming fraudulent legal mail. For example, in Fontroy v.
Beard,203 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected a
First Amendment constitutional challenge to a prison policy requiring a
lawyer correspondent to affix a control number to the envelope before it
would be separately processed as confidential legal mail.204 Under this prison
policy, any attorney could obtain a control number within one day by
submitting a letter request that verified the attorney’s information and
197
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199
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promising to use legal mail for only essential confidential communications
and to enclose no contraband.205 Because the record confirmed that law firm
envelopes had been stolen and return addresses of purported lawyers
falsified, the court agreed “verifying the source of legal mail through the use
of Control Numbers and the safety and security problems posed by inmates
using the legal mail system to smuggle contraband.”206
By contrast, the Sixth Circuit in Knop v. Johnson,207 ruled “that
prisoners may not be required to designate particular attorneys in order to
activate privileged treatment of their legal mail.”208 And, indeed, the Sixth
Circuit maintains that the protections of confidentiality for legal mail attach
to prisoner-lawyer communications that precede initiation of litigation or
creation of an attorney-client relationship.209
In any event, the control number approach approved by the Third Circuit
should have a limited impact on attorney-client exchanges. No comparable
risk of introduction of contraband or other security concerns (as discussed
immediately below) applies to outgoing prisoner mail to attorneys, so
correspondence initiated by the prisoner to the attorney would always remain
confidential. And the prisoner in his initial letter could instruct the attorney
to obtain the control number before responding.
2. Interrupting Illegal Communications
The prison has other security and penological interests that implicate
communication by mail, such as detecting prisoner escape plans and
preventing illegal conduct.210 However, we must remember that we are
addressing here correspondence with attorneys, not family members or other
associates of the prisoner from outside the prison walls.211 In Bout v.
Abramajtys,212 in an unpublished decision, the Sixth Circuit observed:
[T]he risk that the prisoner will attempt to send personal rather than legal mail to a court
is speculative at best. Although that fear is somewhat heightened with mail addressed
to supposed attorneys, this concern can be ameliorated by requiring prisoners to present
in advance the name and business address of the attorney with whom they wish to
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communicate so that the prison officials may verify it in state and reference books
containing attorneys admitted to practice.213

The greater and more legitimate prison security concern is with “bogus
legal mail” that is “disguis[ed] to look like legal mail” and “masquerad[es]
as attorney-client correspondence.”214 Gangs and other criminal enterprises
attempt to smuggle contraband and plan illegal activities by fraudulent legal
mail designed to evade the more thorough inspection methods applied to
ordinary prison mail.215
But assiduously protecting confidentiality in legitimate legal mail does
not undermine prison efforts to intercept fraudulent mailings that are not
being sent to an actual lawyer. A prison has ample alternative and less
intrusive means to verify that the correspondence is with a lawyer,216 just as
the prison verifies that the person on a confidential telephone call or at an inperson meeting with a prisoner is a duly-authorized lawyer. As the Ninth
Circuit observed in Nordstrom v. Ryan,217
[c]hecking a state bar’s list of licensed attorneys is no more onerous than page-by-page
inspection to confirm legal content. Indeed, an [Arizona Department of Corrections]
prison mail supervisor testified that he uses the Arizona Bar Association’s website
‘every single day,’ and that finding out whether a given individual is an attorney can
be done ‘very easily.’218

And of course the prison may investigate when probable cause exists
that a particular prisoner poses a security risk that is being advanced by
supposed legal mail.219 As the Sixth Circuit acknowledged in Reneer v.
Sewell,220 it is “perfectly reasonable . . . that prison officials have authority to
read certain inmate’s mail, where, for example, there is probable cause to
213
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believe the inmate is conspiring with persons outside the prison to traffic in
contraband or to arrange a breakout.”221 A commentator explains that
“reasonable limits can—and should be—imposed upon communications
between [detained criminal defendants who pose a danger] and their lawyers,
albeit in appropriate circumstances and with meaningful judicial review.”222
If the prison has “‘reasonable suspicion that the prison’s security was
being jeopardized,’” then mail could be opened and even read.223 Thus, for
example, in McMaster v. Pung,224 where the female attorney had previously
engaged in sexual activity with the prisoner in the prison room for attorneyclient meetings, the court “agree[d] with the district court’s finding that
appellant’s female attorney was a threat to the security and orderly
administration” and thus “correctional officers were justified in inspecting
appellant’s legal mail to and from the female attorney in his presence.”225
3. Upholding the Critical Need for Attorney-Client Confidentiality
Even when we can imagine a legitimate penological interest for
reviewing the contents of legal mail, “that determination commences rather
than concludes [the judicial] inquiry.”226 The questions would remain
whether prisoners have “alternative means of exercising” the affected
constitutional right and assessment of the burden on the prison of
accommodating the right.227 Especially in criminal matters, prison
“strictures . . . cannot unduly burden [a prisoner’s] fundamental
constitutional right to a vigorous defense by an independent attorney under
the Sixth Amendment.”228
Given that prisoners are captive (pun quite intended) to the prison mail
system, they have no alternative venue for transmitting confidential legal
communications to their legal counsel.229
As discussed earlier,
221

Id. at 260.
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correspondence by mail is essential to ethical and effective representation of
client, for which confidential telephone calls and in-person meetings are not
an adequate substitute in every instance.230 Because the prospect of
correctional officers reading a prisoner’s confidential letters to counsel is so
alarming and so damaging to the attorney-client relationship, such prison
behavior practically invites multiple grievances and continuing disruptions
as well as prejudice to the rights of criminal defendants and civil rights
plaintiffs, which in turn could result in convictions being overturned and
litigation and relief being delayed. And a prison policy allowing access to
the confidential substance of attorney-client correspondence places the
lawyer in what the Ethics Bureau of Yale rightly calls “a Hobson’s choice”
between upholding ethical responsibility to maintain regular communication
with the client and the ethical obligation not to communicate confidential
information in an unsecure means.231
D. READING VERSUS INSPECTION VERSUS SCANNING

1. Impermissibility of Reading Attorney-Client Letters
Every circuit to address the question, whether under the freespeech/access-to-court line of cases or the right to counsel in criminal
matters, agrees that reading of a prisoner’s correspondence with his or her
attorney is forbidden and transgresses constitutional boundaries.232 In Lemon
v. Dugger,233 the Eleventh Circuit stated the proposition in no uncertain
terms: it is “a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights for the prison
officials to read legal mail.”234 In Bell-Bey v. Williams,235 the Sixth Circuit
230

See supra Part I.C.
Brief of the Ethics Bureau at Yale as Amicus Curiae, supra note 90, at 4.
232
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5831213, at *3–4 (D. Nev. Nov. 7, 2018) (arguing that a prison official would need to read
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Ninth Circuit precedent prohibiting such reading); Hmeid v. Nelson Coleman Corr. Ctr., No.
18-3449, 2018 WL 4922381, at *3, 16–17 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2018) (dismissing as frivolous
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his attorney and suggesting that whether reading of legal mail violates the Constitution
requires balancing of prisoner rights and prison security); Toevs v. Quinn, No 15–cv–02838–
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recognized that if a prison “policy directs officials to read prisoners’ legal
mail . . . it could chill a prisoner’s free expression, communication with
counsel, or access to the courts for fear his jailer reads the contents.”236
Even the Fifth Circuit, which departs from other courts to permit
physical inspection of incoming mail for contraband outside the prisoner’s
presence, appears to draw the line at reading, at least for outgoing mail. In
Brewer v. Wilkinson,237 that court allowed prison officials to conduct a nonreading inspection for contraband of incoming mail in the prison
mailroom,238 but did not suggest that the inspection could carry over into
reading the substance of incoming legal mail.239
The sole departure from the otherwise uniform approach across the
decades in every ruling circuit that bars reading of attorney-client
communications may be found in the dissent to the Ninth Circuit’s 2014
decision in the first appeal of Nordstrom v. Ryan.240 To affirm prison security
and to prevent harm to others, the dissenting judge would have allowed
prison personnel “to read legal letters to the extent necessary to detect illegal
conduct.”241
In the Nordstrom dissent’s view, “some reading of the mails” is
necessary to guard against dissemination of escape plans and other proposed
criminal activity.242 The dissent contended that the Supreme Court’s legal
mail decision in Wolff v. McDonnell243 should not be understood to prevent
reading by prison officials of confidential letters to attorneys because the
236

Id. at 839.
3 F.3d 816 (5th Cir. 1993).
238
Id. at 825.
239
For more on Brewer, see supra notes 151–159 and accompanying text. In Walker v.
Navajo County. Jail, 4 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit upheld dismissal of a
prisoner’s complaint alleging that “his incoming legal mail was opened and read but not
censored,” saying this assertion “failed to state a cognizable constitutional claim for denial of
his right to access to the courts.” Id. at 413 (citing Brewer). However, the court explained that
“a jail has a legitimate security interest in opening and inspecting incoming mail for
contraband,” id., without offering any justification for a further intrusion into the substantive
contents of the mail. In any event, the Walker court’s analysis was limited to incoming, rather
than outgoing, legal mail. See supra notes 157–159 and accompanying text (describing the
Brewer court’s reversal of summary judgment against prisoner’s claim regarding outgoing
legal mail).
240
See 762 F.3d 903, 912–21 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., dissenting); see also Evans v.
Skolnik, No. 3:08-cv-00353-RCJ-CBC, 2018 WL 5831213, at *4 (D. Nev. Nov. 7, 2018)
(citing to Judge Bybee’s dissent as supporting the conclusion that inspecting a letter
“necessarily requires reading its contents”). For discussion of the second appeal in Nordstrom
v. Ryan, see infra Part III.D.2.
241
762 F.3d at 916–20.
242
Id. at 916–17.
243
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
237

598

SISK, KING, NISSEN BEITZEL, DUFFUS & KOEHLER [Vol. 109

prison in that case had retreated from that position before the Court decided
the case.244
But that development in the Wolff litigation cuts the other way. Having
wisely abandoned the untenable policy allowing reading mail between
prisoners and their attorneys, the prison sought permission to inspect
incoming legal mail for contraband, while the prisoners’ counsel contended
that even such a limited intrusion breached attorney-client confidentiality.245
The Wolff Court approved a compromise whereby incoming attorney mail
would be opened to inspect for contraband but only in presence of the
prisoners where “the inmate’s presence insures that prison officials will not
read the mail.246 In any event, the dissent acknowledged that other circuits
agreed with the Nordstrom majority that reading of prisoner correspondence
with attorneys contravened constitutional rights.247
Significantly, even the Nordstrom dissent qualified the prison’s
permission to read legal mail to when it would not chill legal
communications.248 As the dissent framed it, “some reading of legal letters
is permissible, absent censorship and the chilling of legal
communications.”249 As the Nordstrom majority recognized, however, a
chilling effect from allowing prison officials to read prisoner letters to
attorneys is obvious and unavoidable: “it is highly likely that a prisoner
would not feel free to confide in his lawyer such things as incriminating or
intimate personal information—as is his Sixth Amendment right to do—if he
knows that the guards are reading his mail.”250
Moreover, a lawyer is ethically required to direct a client not to use a
method of communication that is not confidential and secure.251 Thus, a
lawyer upon learning of a prison policy allowing reading would be ethically
obliged to instruct the prisoner never to use the mail system for
communicating confidential information.
And, because confidential
correspondence with a prisoner often is essential to effective representation,
to uphold the ethical duties of keeping the client informed and acting with
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diligence in the matter, especially for a lawyer who is at any distance from
the prison, the lawyer likely would have to withdraw from representation.252
No greater “chilling effect” on legal communications can be imagined
than creating an environment in which every ethically responsible lawyer
would have to warn prisoner clients never to use legal mail and, as a
consequence of this break-down in regular communications, likely be
ethically mandated to withdraw from representation. In this way, then, the
Nordstrom dissent’s analysis that reading is permissible unless it has a
chilling effect ultimately collapses in on itself.
2. The Danger of Allowing Even Limited Access to the Substantive
Contents of Attorney-Client Mail
In the first appeal in Nordstrom v. Ryan,253 the Ninth Circuit held plainly
that that “the Constitution does not permit . . . reading outgoing attorneyclient correspondence.”254 By contrast, the court said, prison officials were
not prevented from inspecting legal mail “in [the prisoner’s] presence, to
make sure that it does not contain, for example, a map of the prison yard, the
time of guards’ shift changes, escape plans, or contraband.”255 The Arizona
Department of Corrections took this narrow permission for a limited scan of
the contents of the outgoing legal mail as the warrant for an intrusive pageby-page content review of prisoner legal correspondence.256 On a second
appeal, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that skimming the substantive contents
of a prisoner’s outgoing letter to his lawyer contravenes both the First and
Sixth Amendment.257 The limited inspection of outgoing legal mail for
“suspicious features” authorized by the court envisioned a cursory inspection
that involved no reading of the words on the page.258
The Ninth Circuit’s recognition of the obvious—that skimming a letter
for keywords or phrases is reading and destructive of any meaningful
confidentiality259—was a welcome and inevitable response to the
overreaching of the Arizona Department of Corrections.260 At the same time,
252
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the court’s ruling on the first Nordstrom appeal set the stage for confusion,
and invited abuse by an outlying correctional department. By opening the
door to circumscribed access to the contents of the outgoing legal mail
envelope—even for a narrow purpose and to a very limited extent—the Ninth
Circuit departed at least slightly from other circuits that have perceived no
need for prison officials to peek inside the envelope of a letter being delivered
outside the prison and properly addressed to a legitimate lawyer.261
a. Skimming of Legal Mail is a Form of Reading That Would
Eviscerate Confidentiality
Only by the most assiduous protection of the confidentiality of legal
mail can we ensure that an “inmate’s correspondence with his attorney is not
inhibited or chilled by his fear that this correspondence may be read by prison
officials.”262 A prison policy that allowed, not merely an inspection for
contraband, but skimming of the contents of a letter to a lawyer for its
“subject matter,” would “emasculate[] the confidentiality.”263 Far from being
“nearly sacrosanct,”264 attorney-client confidentiality in legal mail would
become a false and illusory promise under any policy allowing content
review by interloping prison officials of that correspondence.
What counts as “reading” in a particular context turns on its purpose and
effect. A driver “reads” a stop sign and understands its message, even though
the sign contains only one word. A diner at a restaurant “reads” the menu by
browsing for entrées of interest. A person “reads” a newspaper, not by
scrutinizing every line of every story on every page, but by checking over the
stories that are of greatest interest to that reader. Each has “read” in a
consequential way.
If a correctional officer were to explore the writing committed to paper
by a prisoner to his lawyer by skimming each page for keywords and
evaluating the legal or non-legal nature of the text, the officer is engaged in
“reading” by any meaningful measure. The privacy of the prisoner’s letter is
destroyed, and the essence of the message is revealed to the prison officer.
For example, if a prisoner writes a letter to counsel containing a
“keyword” such as “sexual assault”—whether to describe himself as a victim
or as a perpetrator—a keyword “scanning” protocol guarantees the content

261
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will be accessed by the correctional officer skimming the letter.265 And if the
officer in the initial scan were to discover a “keyword” or “buzzword”—such
as “kill” or “gun” or “gang”—that the officer mistakenly believes indicates a
security threat, then the officer or his supervisor would have to delve deeper
to determine the context of the passage, which almost surely will be
discussion about the underlying criminal case.
The very kinds of sensitive topics that exemplify the need for
confidentiality in prisoner correspondence with a lawyer are also the very
kinds of nomenclature that a subject-matter skimming approach would target.
As the Ninth Circuit ruled in Nordstrom v. Ryan, a prisoner must be able to
correspond confidentially with his lawyer about “facts of the crime, perhaps
other crimes” to be able to obtain the effective assistance of counsel in a
criminal case.266
In sum, whether described as skimming or scanning, if the prison’s
search protocol intrudes into the substantive content of prisoner legal mail,
nothing meaningful remains of confidentiality. This commonsense and
unavoidable conclusion can be pointedly illustrated by a commonplace
example. Consider the classic family episode of the big sister’s diary being
intercepted by the nosy little brother. If when caught with the diary in hand,
the brother were to retort that he was “not reading it, but only skimming for
keywords,” the sister would not be mollified. Skimming no less than reading
wholly destroys confidentiality and invades the privacy of the narrative.
b. The Rare Prospect of the Rogue Lawyer Engaging in Criminal
Misconduct
The prospect that some lawyer somewhere and sometime may engage
in misconduct with a prisoner cannot justify lifting confidentiality in all other
attorney-client communications given the vital constitutional rights inherent
in protecting such confidentiality. As one court reasonably observed, the
contents of legal mail “‘cannot, except on the most speculative theory,
damage the security interests of jail administration’” and, even in the unlikely
event, “‘it must be assumed’” that any outgoing mail to “‘licensed attorneys’”
that did contain contraband or information about illegal activities would be
properly treated by the recipients.267

265
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Nor have federal and state correctional institutions found it appropriate
to lump prisoner counsel into the category of security dangers justifying
intrusion into attorney-client confidentiality, absent indicia of wrongdoing.
As the Third Circuit in Jones v. Brown268 held, a prison’s supposition that
legal mail might contain plans for escape or to incite violence could not
justify opening and reading legal mail: “[W]hile it was true that legal mail
conceivably might contain such plans and the opening of it might
conceivably thwart those plans, the risk allegedly addressed was too
insubstantial to justify incursion on First Amendment interests.”269
Because a rogue lawyer is unlikely to commit damning evidence of
illegality to writing that is sent through the prison mail system, the rare case
of abusive communications by a lawyer with a prisoner is more likely to
occur during telephone calls or in-person meetings. And yet surely no court
or correctional system would contemplate that prisons begin monitoring
confidential telephone calls between prisoners and lawyers or bugging the
rooms where inmates meet with their counsel.
The comparatively negligible risk that a lawyer will engage in illicit
correspondence with a prisoner makes intrusion into the substance of such
confidential communications all the harder to justify. And, of course, the
prison remains able to intrude into such attorney-client communications—by
voice or letter—when there is probable cause that wrongdoing is afoot.270 A
general policy of regular access to the contents of attorney-client
communications, even for a brief inspection of those contents, runs too hard
against the sacrosanct nature of and heightened need for confidentiality in
attorney-client communications.
The rare case of the miscreant lawyer is illustrative of the point. In
1995, Sheikh Abdul Rahman was convicted, in the words of a court, “of
engaging in a seditious conspiracy to wage a war of urban terrorism against
the United States, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and a plot
to bomb New York City landmarks.”271 In 2005, attorney Lynne Stewart,
who continued to represent Rahman after his conviction,272 was found guilty
by a jury, among other charges, of “providing and concealing material
support to a conspiracy to kill and kidnap persons in a foreign country.”273
Using her trusted position as an attorney, Stewart had “smuggled messages
to and from the incarcerated Abdel Rahman” encouraging renewed violence
268
269
270
271
272
273
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by an Egyptian militant group274 and cooperated in dissemination of “a
fatwah to kill Jewish people.”275 This attorney’s misconduct was carried out,
not by sending letters through the prison mail system, but through in-person
meetings and telephone calls with the client in the prison.276
Significantly, access to attorney-client communications between
Stewart and Rahman in prison and the securing of evidence of criminal
conspiracy was obtained in proper course through a warrant approved by a
judge based on probable cause.277 Even with such probable cause of
wrongdoing and a warrant, the government used a special privilege unit, or
“taint team,” to monitor these communications, which then redacted the
material to prevent any attorney-client privilege or work product information
from being shared with government trial attorneys.278 Moreover, as a
warning to other lawyers, Stewart received an enhanced sentence because her
actions “constituted an abuse of her trust and privilege as a member of the
bar.”279
In sum, even in the volatile environment of terrorist conspiracies, the
government may not presume that every lawyer is a criminal suspect and
conduct general monitoring of attorney-client communications, whether oral
274
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or written. Instead, before intruding into the substance of those exchanges,
the government must establish individualized suspicion that the attorneyclient relationship is being abused in a particular circumstance.
c. Nordstrom v. Ryan: Rejecting Skimming and Highlighting Absence
of Evidence of Lawyer Abuse of Legal Mail
In Nordstrom v. Ryan,280 the Ninth Circuit held plainly that that “the
Constitution does not permit . . . reading outgoing attorney-client
communication.”281 By contrast, the court said, prison officials were not
prevented from inspecting legal mail “in [the prisoner’s] presence, to make
sure that it does not contain, for example, a map of the prison yard, the time
of guards’ shift changes, escape plans, or contraband.”282 In this way, the
Ninth Circuit departed at least slightly from other circuits in permitting
prison officials to look inside the contents of the legal mail,283 albeit for a
distinctly limited purpose and to a pointedly limited extent.
By opening the door even a little to review the contents of prisonerattorney correspondence, however, the Ninth Circuit inadvertently invited
abuse by prison officials or overzealousness in inspections by poorly trained
correctional officers. “Inspection” or “scanning” of the contents of
confidential legal mail could become weasel words used by prison
administration to justify broad intrusions into legal mail. And that is just
what happened as the Nordstrom case continued.
In its first appellate decision in Nordstrom v. Ryan,284 the Ninth Circuit
issued a landmark opinion upholding a death row inmate’s Sixth Amendment
280

762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 910–11.
282
Id. at 910.
283
In Guajardo-Palma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801 (7th Cir. 2010), the Seventh Circuit
said that a prison employee opening an incoming envelope, “to protect the prison’s interest in
security. . . will have to glance at the content to verify its bona fides.” Id. at 805. But none of
the letters at issue in that case were from the prisoner’s lawyer. Id. at 806. In any event, a quick
glance at incoming mail to confirm that it is from an attorney and that the envelope does not
contain contraband does not intrude into the substantive contents of the correspondence. And,
the Seventh Circuit emphasized, a practice of reading such letters would offend constitutional
principles of due process. Id. at 805. In Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299 (7th Cir. 1986), the
Seventh Circuit had approved a prison policy allowing incoming privileged mail to “be opened
in the presence of the committed person to whom it is addressed to inspect for contraband, to
verify the identity of the sender, and to determine that nothing other than legal or official
matter is enclosed.” Id. at 1305–06. However, the court clarified that what was contemplated
by this policy was not an actual evaluation of the contents or nature of the enclosed material
but only that “prison officials [may] search privileged mail for contraband while the prisoners
look on.” Id. at 1306.
284
762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014).
281
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right to correspond confidentially with his attorney and firmly rejecting the
position of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) that correctional
officers may read outgoing legal mail:
In American criminal law, the right to privately confer with counsel is nearly
sacrosanct. It is obvious to us that a policy or practice permitting prison officials to not
just inspect or scan, but to read an inmate’s letters to his counsel is highly likely to
inhibit the sort of candid communications that the right to counsel and the attorneyclient privilege are meant to protect.285

On remand, rather than revising its legal mail policy to respect the confidentiality of attorney-client legal mail, the ADC dismissed the Ninth
Circuit’s constitutional ruling as a quibble about “vocabulary words.”286
Other than a cosmetic substitution of the words “inspect” or “scan” for
“read,” the new ADC policy reaffirmed review of the text of a letter to
counsel to “verify that its contents qualify as legal mail and do not contain
communications about illegal activity.”287 To prop up the policy of
“scanning” the substantive contents of prisoner legal correspondence, the
ADC further altered the common definition of “contraband” to cover “nonlegal” documents submitted as legal mail.288
At an evidentiary hearing, the prison mail supervisor, stated that
correctional officers should “inspect that document [prisoner letter to a
lawyer] page by page, one at a time.”289 In this inspection, the officer looks
at the content of the letter for “keywords to determine its legal legitimacy.”
290
He explained that inspecting, not only for contraband but also for
“whether it qualifies as legal mail,” takes from 15 to 30 seconds for each
page.291 The deputy warden testified that correspondence between a prisoner
and counsel about music, sports, or anything beyond “legal documents”
constitutes “contraband.”292 As “contraband,” the letter could be seized for
further examination.293
285

Id. at 910 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Defendant’s Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Suggestion of
Mootness at 3, Nordstrom v. Ryan, No. CV11-02344-PHX-DGC(MEA) (D. Ariz. Jan. 15,
2015).
287
Arizona Dept. of Corr., Director’s Office, Memorandum, Director’s Instruction ! 333,
Modification of Department Order 902, Inmate Legal Access to the Courts, Nordstrom v.
Ryan, No. CV11-02344-PHX-DGC(MEA) (D. Ariz. Jan. 8, 2015).
288
Id.
289
Transcript of Proceedings at 167, Nordstrom v. Ryan, No. CV11-02344-PHX-DGC
(MEA) (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2015).
290
Id. at 166.
291
Id. at 167.
292
Id. at 189–90.
293
Id.
286
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The correctional officer who collected mail on death row, stated that he
“scans” mail to “make sure that it actually is, in fact, legal mail and it’s not
anything personal in nature.”294 When asked on cross-examination about the
difference between scanning and reading, this officer volunteered that “the
definition of ‘scanning’ is to hastily read something.”295
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court acknowledged that
“what these officers are doing are reading portions of the letter. I can’t get
around that.”296 Nonetheless, the court ruled that “reading” of legal mail is
prohibited only if it involves “reading the text of the letter line-by-line.”297
The district court reasoned that the ADC’s policy of searching the contents
of outgoing attorney-client mail for keywords and nomenclature was justified
by the problem of “inmates send[ing] criminal communications in mail
masquerading as attorney-client correspondence.”298
However, despite its practice of “scanning” all outgoing legal mail, the
ADC had never found an outgoing letter from a prisoner to an actual lawyer
at the correct address that posed any security threat, enclosed any contraband,
or asked any lawyer to engage in illegal activity. At the evidentiary hearing,
the special security coordinator, with 26 years at the Arizona prison, admitted
he had never seen abuse of legal mail involving actual lawyers.299 Likewise,
the police detective testifying to episodes of abuse of legal mail
acknowledged that he could not recount a single incident where a letter going
from a prisoner to an actual lawyer had been intercepted as improper.300 Not
one of the pieces of fraudulent legal mail presented by the ADC at the hearing
involved genuine prisoner correspondence to an actual lawyer.301
The district court acknowledged that the evidence presented about the
problem of “bogus legal mail” had not included any example of “criminal
communications in a letter to or from a legitimate licensed attorney.”302
Instead, the court relied on evidence that three lawyers and a mitigation
specialist had passed illegal drugs in or had carried messages out from inperson meetings in a county jail to conclude that “prison officials cannot
294

Id. at 147.
Id. at 154.
296
Id. at 238.
297
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 128 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1215 (D. Ariz. 2016), rev’d, 856 F.3d 1235
(9th Cir. 2017); see also Allah v. Virginia, No. 7:16CV00002, 2017 WL 1901650, at *5 (W.D.
Va. May 9, 2017) (upholding prison practice of searching legal mail for gang writings by
“reading . . . in sufficient detail to recognize” gang identifiers).
298
Nordstrom, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 1216.
299
Transcript, supra note 289, at 216.
300
Id. at 141.
301
Id. at 171–74.
302
Nordstrom, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 1206–07.
295
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assume a communication does not present a security threat simply because it
is addressed to or from a licensed attorney.”303 Accordingly, the court upheld
the ADC’s policy of reviewing the substantive contents of prisoner mail to
legal counsel against First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims.304
If this intrusive practice had continued, the ADC’s policy effectively
nullified the constitutional promise of confidentiality for prisoners in
corresponding with their lawyers. By allowing correctional officers to skim
through legal correspondence for keywords and to verify legal content, the
confidentiality of the letter was irretrievably lost. Skimming is no less
destructive of confidentiality than line-by-line reading.305 Indeed, the ADC’s
protocol of skimming for keywords or components was tailor-made to
uncover the very type of communication—about “facts of the crime, perhaps
other crimes,” etc.—that the Ninth Circuit had specifically declared should
not be uncovered by a prison guard.306 By insisting on the power to evaluate
the substance of outgoing prisoner mail to attorneys, the ADC had not merely
pushed the envelope. The ADC had ripped the envelope of attorney-client
confidentiality away altogether.
Not surprisingly, then, the Ninth Circuit on a second appeal recognized
that the ADC’s skimming protocol continued and even intensified the
illegitimate practice of reading confidential prisoner correspondence to
lawyers.307 In the return visit to the Ninth Circuit of Nordstrom v. Ryan,308
the court of appeals clarified that the permissible “‘cursory visual
inspection’” of outgoing legal mail “should be for ‘suspicious features’ that
can readily be identified without reading the words on a page; i.e., ‘maps of
the prison yard, the times of guards’ shift changes, and the like.’”309 By
contrast, the ADC’s “page-by-page content review of inmates’ confidential
outgoing legal mail” fails constitutional muster.310
The court further invalidated the ADC’s boot-strap policy of redefining
“contraband” to include “non-legal written correspondence or
communication.”311 Observing that the common definition of “contraband”
refers to “smuggled or otherwise illegal goods,” the court refused to accept
303

Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1217, 1219–20.
305
See supra Part III.D.2.a.
306
See Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2014).
307
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1235, 1268 (9th Cir. 2017).
308
Id.
309
Id. at 1272 (quoting Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 906; Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265–
66 (9th Cir. 1995)).
310
Id. at 1268.
311
Nordstrom, 856 F.3d at 1272.
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the ADC’s “broad definition of contraband [to] transform[] permissible
inspection into page-by-page content review of inmates’ confidential
outgoing legal mail.”312
The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the ADC’s policy of evaluating
outgoing prisoner letters to lawyers for its “legal” content fits comfortably
with the Sixth Circuit’s contemporaneous ruling in American Civil Liberties
Union Fund of Michigan.313 The Sixth Circuit enjoined jail personnel from
making a “‘subjective’ and inexpert determination as to whether a particular
legal matter is ‘legitimate’” for attorney correspondence to a prisoner to be
treated as protected legal mail.314 Rejecting such a review of “the content of
the letters,” the court said that—
[A] system in which the Jail may first independently screen the substance of the legal
communication from an attorney to a specific inmate regarding the constitutionality of
jail policies would defeat the very reason to protect legal mail—to safeguard sensitive
and confidential legal communication. Of course, this means the Jail would not know
the contents of the communication, but this is true of all legal mail.315

Finally, the ADC’s exceptional policy and practice of reviewing the
substantive contents of outgoing prisoner letters to lawyers was based on a
dangerous syllogism destructive of fundamental constitutional rights and due
process. As discussed above, the ADC’s witnesses admitted there had not
been a single episode in the history of the Arizona prison system in which
legal mail sent to an actual lawyer had been abused.316 Nonetheless, because
three lawyers for jail inmates elsewhere had engaged in misconduct (not
involving legal mail), the ADC regarded all lawyers as criminal suspects.
The Ninth Circuit agreed, of course, that “outgoing legal mail could be
used to facilitate criminal activity, but ADC did not present any evidence that
this has ever happened, or that it is likely to happen.”317 While the ADC was
eager to sacrifice attorney-client confidentiality on the altar of prison
security, the “ADC presented no evidence that outgoing legal mail addressed
to a licensed attorney has ever posed the security threats identified by the
district court.”318
312

Id.; see also In re Jordan, 500 P.2d 873, 876 (Cal. 1972) (characterizing prison’s
reference to “verbal contraband” to justify “inspecting” the “subject matter” of prisoner legal
mail as “an ingenious effort to expand the reasonable (and legislative) meaning of a term to
include what was never meant to be included within the meaning of ‘contraband’”).
313
796 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2015).
314
Id. at 648.
315
Id. at 645 (emphasis in original).
316
See supra notes 299–301 and accompanying text.
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Nordstrom, 856 F.3d at 1273.
318
Id.

2019]

READING THE PRISONER'S LETTER

609

IV. PROCEDURES FOR ASSERTING RIGHT TO CONFIDENTIALITY IN
PRISONER LEGAL MAIL
Although the foundational principles of confidentiality of legal mail are
coalescing around the First and Sixth Amendments in the federal courts of
appeals, resistance recurs occasionally in the federal district courts, even to
the point of insisting that some reading of attorney-client mail is
permissible.319 Moreover, even when the foundations are accepted, litigation
persists to this day about correctional officer tampering with legal mail,
ranging from opening of legal mail outside the presence of the prisoner320 to
reading the specific contents of and even copying prisoner correspondence
with legal counsel.321
A prisoner cannot establish an unconstitutional intrusion into the
confidentiality of prisoner legal mail on the merits without navigating around
a daunting series of procedural and other obstacles. These prerequisites and
limitations are grounded in the Constitution (standing322 and qualified
319

See supra note 232.
For examples in just the past two years of court rulings on complaints asserting
improper opening of legal mail, see, e.g., Gibson v. Bibb County Law Enforcement Center,
5:17-CV-423-MTT-CHW, 2018 WL 1221870, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2018) (denying
dismissal of a prisoner’s First Amendment claim alleging opening of mail on two occasions
as sufficiently showing a regular and unjustified practice); Pitts v. Tuitama, No. 17-00137
JMS-KSC, 2017 WL 3880653, at *3–4 (D. Haw. Sept. 5, 2017) (going forward with a
prisoner’s First Amendment claim about opening of legal mail even though envelope may not
have included a privilege marking or the attorney’s bar number as required by prison
regulation); Geier v. Davis, No.16-cv-01980-JSC, 2017 WL 1133219, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
27, 2017) (dismissing a prisoner’s First Amendment claim alleging opening of legal mail
outside his presence on a single occasion as barred by qualified immunity but denying
dismissal of Sixth Amendment claim).
321
For examples in just the past two years of court rulings on complaints alleging
correctional officers have read legal mail, see, e.g., Carson v. Ryan, No. CV-17-01641-PHXROS (BSB), 2018 WL 4782325, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2018) (concluding that the prisoner
stated a First Amendment claim by alleging that prison officials had conspired to read his legal
mail); Smith v. Eckstein, No. 17–cv–667–pp, 2018 WL 2976031, at *1–3 (E.D. Wis. June 13,
2018) (proceeding forward on the plaintiff’s First and Sixth Amendment claims alleging that
jail officials had opened and read the prisoner’s letter to defense counsel and then sent a copy
of the letter to the prosecutor, who declined to read it and notified the criminal court); Patterson
v. Johnson, No. 17-cv-1067-MJR, 2017 WL 6021832, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2017) (ruling
that a prisoner stated a First Amendment claim by alleging that a prison official admitted he
read legal mail to ensure the prisoner was not suing anyone at the prison); Ellison v. Montana
Wardens, CV 17–00045–H–DLC–JTJ, 2017 WL 9324794, at *1–4 (D. Mont. June 21, 2017)
(ruling that a prisoner stated claims under the First and Sixth Amendments by alleging that
mail from his attorney had been “opened and ransacked” by prison officials who removed
material and insisted they could “do as they pleased” and who asserted it was not “legal mail”
even though sent by the Appellate Defenders’ Office).
322
See infra Part IV.C.
320
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immunity323), federal statutes (exhaustion of the prison grievance system324
and limitations on available relief325), and court rules (pleading326).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)327 “rewrote both the law of
procedure and the law of remedies in individual inmate cases in federal
court,” imposing special rules on exhaustion of administrative remedies,
filing fees, costs, judicial screening of complaints, limitations on damages,
restrictions on injunctive relief, and limitations on attorney’s fees.328 In this
part of the Article, we focus on those elements of the PLRA that may apply
to legal mail cases in a particular way, as contrasted with the rules that
generally apply to all prisoner civil rights suits.
A. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: THE PRISON
GRIEVANCE PROCESS AND LEGAL MAIL CASES

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner must
exhaust prison grievance procedures before filing a suit challenging prison
conditions.329 Many, perhaps most, prisoner civil rights suits run aground on
the exhaustion requirement.330
In Krilich v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,331 a prisoner argued that a
prison’s “attempts to intrude on [attorney-client] confidentiality are not
‘prison conditions’” and therefore the case was not subject to the prison
grievance requirements of the PLRA.332 The Sixth Circuit responded that
“[p]rison intrusions on a prisoner’s privacy, legitimate or not, are obviously

323

See infra Part IV.E.
See infra Part IV.A.
325
See infra Part IV.D.
326
See infra Part IV.B.
327
Pub L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321 –66 to –77 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
328
Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1627 (2003); see also
BARBARA BELBOT & CRAIG HEMMENS, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 219–20 (2010)
(generally discussing the provisions of the PLRA).
329
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (West 2018) (“No action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983), or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”).
330
See Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The
Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1778 (2008); see also Derek
Borchardt, Note, The Iron Curtain Redrawn Between Prisoners and the Constitution, 43
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L REV. 469, 470–71 (2012) (for a prisoner seeking judicial protection, the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement proved to be the largest hurdle).
331
346 F.3d 157 (6th Cir. 2003).
332
Id. at 159.
324
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prison conditions” and thus the duty to exhaust the prison grievance process
fully applied.333
When the prison grievance process includes multiple steps, typically
providing for appeal from an initial unfavorable answer to a higher level
within the prison administration, the prisoner is obliged to timely complete
every single stage before initiating a civil rights complaint.334 When
litigation arises, however, the burden falls on the defendant to show that the
prisoner had failed to comply with the prison’s grievance system.335
In theory, the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA does not demand
detailed notice on every aspect of a potential claim. To begin with, a
grievance need only have “the level of detail required by the prison’s
regulations.”336 “[W]hen a prison’s grievance procedures are silent or
incomplete as to factual specificity, ‘a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison
to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.’”337
In other words, “the grievant need not lay out the facts, articulate legal
theories, or demand particular relief.”338 Instead, “[a]ll the grievance need
do is object intelligibly to some asserted shortcoming.”339 As the Supreme
Court reiterated in Jones v. Bock, “‘the primary purpose of a grievance is to
alert prison officials to a problem.’”340 A grievance is not an opening salvo
in an adversarial process but the invitation to the prison administration to
deliberate and resolve the problem.

333

Id.
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (explaining, in context of prison
grievance requirements, that administrative exhaustion means properly using all steps
afforded by the agency process); Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008) (ruling
that “[t]o exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with the PLRA, prisoners must
‘properly take each step within the administrative process;’” internal citation omitted).
335
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211–16 (2007) (holding that an asserted failure by
the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be raised by the
defendant).
336
Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 824 (9th Cir. 2010).
337
Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650
(7th Cir. 2002)); see also Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1283 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating
that the “grievance will satisfy the exhaustion requirement so long as it is not ‘so vague as to
preclude prison officials from taking appropriate measures to resolve the complaint
internally;’” citations omitted).
338
Strong, 297 F.3d at 650.
339
Id.; see generally Antonieta Pimienta, Overcoming Administrative Silence in Prisoner
Litigation: Grievance Specificity and the “Object Intelligibly” Standard, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
1209, 1210 (2014).
340
Jones, 549 U.S. at 219 (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir.
2004)).
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Unfortunately, prisons typically demand “meticulously correct prior use
of onerous and error-inviting prison grievance procedures”341 and are quick
to assert that a prisoner’s grievance failed to specifically advert to the type of
claim later made in a civil rights suit. To be sure, a rule of administrative
exhaustion imposing “technicalities” that forfeit a litigant’s claims through
procedural errors is “particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which
laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.”342 Nonetheless,
prisons will seize on any purported ambiguity or omission in a grievance to
seek dismissal of a civil rights suit before a hearing on the merits.
Accordingly, the prisoner would be well-advised to be fairly specific
about the nature of any prison intrusion into the confidentiality of legal mail
and any consequences that follow. If the objection stated in the grievance is
only to the opening of legal mail outside the prisoner’s presence, the prison
likely will argue that a later claim of reading of the mail was not sufficiently
encompassed within the literal terms of the grievance. If the prisoner objects
generally to interference with legal mail but does not specify that that
attorney-client mail was involved, the prison may assert that a civil rights
complaint focused on interference with the attorney-client relationship was
not adequately grieved. If the prisoner is asserting deliberate interference
with confidential attorney-client mail, the grievance might specify that the
reading or opening was done intentionally and not inadvertently.343 In any
of these hypothetical instances, the prison’s objection should be rejected, as
the purpose of the grievance was fully served by alerting the prison to a
problem involving legal mail. But the prisoner wanting to avoid the
distraction of later litigating an exhaustion question should specify the nature
of the legal mail involved and the character of the prison’s intrusion at each
stage of the grievance process.
When a prisoner has placed the prison on notice through a grievance of
a problem with respect to confidential legal mail, the prisoner should not be
legally obliged to submit a new grievance for every new application of an
ongoing policy or practice. In Diaz v. Palakovich,344 the Third Circuit held
in an unpublished decision that a prisoner who had indisputably “fully
exhausted” at least “one grievance relating to the opening of his legal mail
outside of his presence” was not obliged to exhaust the process for seven

341
See Margo Schlanger, Prisoners’ Rights Lawyers’ Strategies for Preserving the Role
of the Courts, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 519, 520 (2015).
342
Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972).
343
On whether inadvertent intrusions into legal mail constitute a constitutional violation,
see infra Part IV.C.1.
344
448 Fed. App’x 211 (3d Cir. 2011).
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other grievances making the same complaint.345 Instead, the court said,
“[t]hose seven other grievances are contemporaneous parts of the prison
record as they all address the same practice of improper legal mail handling
and directly bear on the fully exhausted grievance addressing the identical
issue.”346 Similarly, in Aiello v. Litscher,347 a District Court held that once
having exhausted the grievance process in challenging a prison policy
regarding access to First Amendment-protected material, the prisoners were
not obliged to file another grievance for subsequent incidents in which the
policy is applied: “Each alleged unconstitutional application is not treated as
a separate grievance but rather as evidence that the regulation is not
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. . . .”348 Accordingly, a
prisoner challenging a formal prison policy that allows reading or opening or
another violation of attorney-client confidentiality in correspondence is not
required to file more than one grievance, at the risk of being precluded from
presenting evidence about the ongoing application in a later civil rights suit.
Here, too, though, the wise prisoner will preempt any possibility that the
prison will insist that each individual episode had to be separately grieved.
Moreover, by persistence in filing a new grievance for each repeat
performance by prison officers of improper intrusion into legal mail, the
prisoner creates an administrative record that may contradict a later attempt
by prison officials to downplay the frequency or regularity of the problem.
Indeed, a series of grievances on repeated incidents of interference with legal
mail may serve as evidence that a supervisor or warden had knowledge of
and acquiesced in subordinates’ violations of legal mail confidentiality, as
necessary to prove personal liability under Section 1983 by a supervisor.349
Importantly, a prisoner is not required to name in the grievance all
persons who might conceivably be named as defendants in a later lawsuit.
To again quote the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Bock, “the primary
purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide
personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued; the grievance is
not a summons and complaint that initiates adversarial litigation.”350 Thus,
a prisoner grievance that names the correctional officer who opened or read
345

Id. at 216.
Id.; see also Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 520–21 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
prisoner who had completed the grievance process and notified the prison that he was being
subjected to repeated sexual assaults was not required to file a new grievance for each new
episode of assault).
347
104 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
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Id. at 1074.
349
See, e.g., Diaz v. Palakovich, 448 Fed. App’x 211, 215–16.
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Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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legal mail has served the purpose. If the matter later results in civil litigation,
the prisoner should be permitted to name the officer’s supervisor, mail-room
individuals, warden, or corrections director as appropriate when seeking
recompense for past violations or injunctive relief against future violations.
Moreover, the very fact that the grievance is addressed at subsequent stages
to such higher officers in the prison administration is more than adequate
notice of their official responsibility for the matter.
B. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF PRO SE PRISONER COMPLAINTS IN
LEGAL MAIL CASES

Most civil rights suits involving prisoners will begin (and end) with pro
se complaints.351 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the District Court
is instructed to “screen” the prisoner complaint to “identify cognizable
claims” or to dismiss any claim that is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted” or where monetary relief is sought
“from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”352 Statutory screening
of prisoner complaints allows a court to dismiss all or part of a complaint sua
sponte for failure to state a claim, “incorporat[ing] the familiar standard
applied . . . under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”353
Through the Iqbal-Twombly (or Twiqbal) line of cases, the Supreme
Court has directed that a complaint filed by an attorney on behalf of a plaintiff
must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”354 However, the Supreme Court
continues to say that “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”355
As the Ninth Circuit ruled in Wilhelm v. Rotman, “Iqbal did not alter the
rule that, ‘where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases,
351

See Szillery v. Career Sys. Dev. Corp., No. CV–08–62–B–W, 2008 WL 2789492, at
*2 (D. Me. July 17, 2008) (observing that “a pro se party, often a prisoner, realizes he is out
of his depth and urgently petitions for counsel, the appointment of which is a decided rarity in
civil cases,” with the consequence that “most frequently, the pro se party’s complaint, again
often a prisoner’s, is simply ‘doomed to failure in federal court’”); Barrick Bollman, Note,
Deference and Prisoner Accommodations Post-Holt: Moving RLUIPA Toward “Strict in
Theory, Strict in Fact,” 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 839, 869 (2018) (“[P]risoners often file pro se and
often lack the resources and legal knowledge needed to represent their arguments
effectively.”).
352
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
353
Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).
354
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
355
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal citations omitted).
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[courts should] construe the pleadings liberally and . . . afford the petitioner
the benefit of any doubt.’”356 The federal courts of appeals thus hold the
prisoner to the “plausible on its face” standard of Twiqbal, while
simultaneously emphasizing that a prisoner pro se complaint is to be liberally
construed.357
By this analysis, pro se prisoners only need meet a “low threshold for
proceeding past the screening stage.”358 A pro se complaint must be
construed “liberally” and may be dismissed only if it appears “beyond doubt”
that no set of facts could be proven to entitle the plaintiff to relief.359
The rationale underlying liberal construction of pro se pleadings is even
more compelling in light of the instructions to the form complaints that
District Courts typically direct prisoners to use, which explicitly discourage
factual detail.360
Given the many litigated cases in which prison authorities have intruded
into confidential prisoner-attorney mail, the allegation of such an episode
should easily pass the facial plausibility standard, especially under liberal
construction. Thus, if a prisoner alleges a practice or policy of reading
confidential attorney-client mail, the complaint should not be dismissed
without at least a judicial investigation into whether sufficient evidence of
the practice or policy is present for standing.361 In Nordstrom v. Ryan,362 for
example, the prisoner alleged that a correctional officer had read his
confidential letter to his lawyer and that the director of the state correctional
department had notified him that legal mail was subject to being read. 363
356

Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Balcar v. Jefferson Cty. Dist. Ct., No. 17-5402, 2017 WL 4535934, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept.
8, 2017); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that “even after
Twombly and Iqbal, pro se complaints . . . are to be construed liberally”) (internal citations
omitted); Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2008) (ruling that, despite new
Twombly pleading standard, liberal construction rule continued to apply to pro se complaint).
358
Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123.
359
Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
360
See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, Civil Rights Complaint
Instructions-Form at 3 (Rev. 2016) (advising pro se plaintiffs to state the underlying facts “as
briefly as possible”), http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/forms/Civil%20Rights%
20Complaint%20instructions-form.pdf [https://perma.cc/63SB-YVZ9]; U.S. DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Complaint Under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, at 2 (Rev. 2018) (same), https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/forms/
frmc1983f.pdf [https://perma.cc/2875-ZBDA]; U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
NEW JERSEY, Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint, at 5 (Rev. 2013) (same), http://www.n
jd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/forms/DNJ-ProSe-006.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HRW-LAZ5].
361
See infra Part IV.C.
362
762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014).
363
Id. at 906–07.
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Citing the rule of liberal construction for pro se complaints, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the prisoner’s “allegations that prison officials read his legal mail,
that they claim entitlement to do so, and that his right to private consultation
with counsel has been chilled state a Sixth Amendment claim.”364
C. STANDING FOR LEGAL MAIL CLAIMS

1. Proving a Practice or a Policy of Reading or Opening AttorneyClient Mail
To have standing to raise a claim of unconstitutional interference with
the confidentiality of legal mail, a prisoner must either (1) show a practice of
tampering with legal mail, or (2) adduce a policy allowing reading and “show
that the prison has enforced the purportedly unconstitutional policy against
him.”365
First, appreciating that mistakes may be made even by conscientious
prison employees implementing proper prison policies on legal mail, the
prisoner must establish a “pattern and practice” of interference with legal
mail not merely to establish standing but to assert a constitutional
violation.366 Thus, the prisoner must show regular interference with
confidential mail rather than isolated and inadvertent mistakes.367 A onetime accidental opening of a single piece of legal mail is not cognizable as a
constitutional violation.368
However, the courts have proven quick to find the necessary pattern
when the number of intrusions on confidentiality add up to more than a
solitary mistake. In Washington v. James,369 the Second Circuit determined
that only two incidents of interference with legal mail indicated “an alleged
continuing activity rather than a single isolated instance.”370 In Bieregu v.
Reno, the Sixth Circuit ruled that three documented occasions of opening
court mail outside the prisoner’s presence was sufficient “for a reasonable

364

Id. at 911.
Miller v. Jones, 483 Fed. App’x 202, 203 (6th Cir. 2012) (reversing summary judgment
in prison officials’ favor and holding that a fact issue remained on whether prison officials had
read prisoner’s outgoing mail, thus giving him standing to sue under the First Amendment).
366
See Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1452 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds,
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
367
See Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997) (saying that “an isolated,
inadvertent instance of opening incoming confidential legal mail” did not support a civil rights
claim).
368
See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003).
369
782 F.2d 1134 (2d Cir. 1986).
370
Id. at 1139.
365
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person to infer that there exists a pattern and practice of opening plaintiff’s
incoming court mail outside his presence.”371
Moreover, even an isolated incident may infringe the prisoner’s
constitutionally-protected right of confidentiality if performed with an
“improper motive.”372 Thus, if a prison official had a deliberate intent to gain
access to confidential material or acted “arbitrarily or capriciously” to
interfere with two or three pieces of mail, a constitutional violation is
stated.373
Second, and by contrast, when the question is the validity of a prison
policy, whether formally adopted as a regulation or expressly stated in
another manner,374 then the prisoner need not establish any pattern or allege
a series of episodes. Rather, the prisoner need only show that such a policy
exists and that it has been applied to the prisoner on at least one occasion.375
A constitutional claim is stated when the prisoner shows either “a state
pattern and practice, or . . . explicit policy” of interference with protected
attorney-client communications.376 “[W]here the harm alleged is directly
traceable to a written policy, there is an implicit likelihood of its repetition in
the immediate future.”377
2. Standing for First Amendment Free Speech Claim
When a prisoner alleges a constitutional injury to free speech rights by
a prison’s interference with legal mail, the courts agree that a prisoner need
“assert an injury no more tangible than a chilling effect on First Amendment
rights.”378 Thus, a prisoner need not show that underlying litigation in which
371

59 F.3d at 1452.
Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990).
373
Hayes v. Idaho Cor. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1212 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that, where the
prisoner “alleged a plausible claim that his protected mail was arbitrarily or capriciously
opened outside his presence on two separate occasions,” that “[n]othing further is required”);
Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 2009) (ruling that “two or three pieces
of mail opened in an arbitrary or capricious way suffice to state a claim”). But see Hayes, 849
F.3d at 1214, 1216–17 (Bybee, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (resisting the arbitrary and
capricious standard and insisting that “proof of intentional, not merely negligent, acts” is
necessary to show a constitutional violation).
374
See Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 911–12 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding sufficient
allegations of standing where the prisoner adduced a written statement by the director of
corrections allowing reading of legal mail by prison officials and application of that policy to
him on one occasion).
375
Id.
376
Jones v. Block, 461 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2006).
377
Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 861 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds
by Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 504–05 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
378
Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001).
372
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she is represented by an attorney has been disrupted or prejudiced by the
prison’s intrusive policy or practice.
In Jones v. Brown,379 the Third Circuit outlined the current test for
prisoner standing to challenge a prison policy on legal mail as violating the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.380 In Lewis v. Casey,381 in
which prisoners claimed that restrictions on use of the prison law library
infringed their constitutional right of access to the courts, the Supreme Court
had held that a prisoner must prove that he had actually been injured by denial
of access to the courts, that is, was hindered in pursuing a legal claim.382 By
contrast, the Third Circuit explained in Jones, a prisoner asserting a free
speech claim need not prove an injury-in-fact “beyond the infringement of
constitutionally-protected speech.”383 The Third Circuit reasoned that the
requisite injury to assert standing depends on the nature of the right being
asserted:
Unlike the provision of legal libraries or legal services, which are not constitutional
“ends in themselves, but only the means for ensuring ‘a reasonably adequate
opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the
courts,’” protection of an inmate’s freedom to engage in protected communications is
a constitutional end in itself.384

In Lewis, the Supreme Court had characterized the right at issue there
as being the “right of access to the courts,” not “the right to a law library or
to legal assistance.”385 In the Jones legal mail case, by contrast, the right at
issue was the freedom of speech, a right that directly encompasses
confidential exchanges by a prisoner with his lawyer.386
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit in Al-Amin v. Smith387 held that a
prisoner objecting to interference with legal mail properly raised a “free
speech claim [that] is distinct from his access-to-courts claim.”388 Agreeing
with the Third Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that “the actual injury
requirement applies to access-to-courts claims but not to free speech
claims.”389 The Ninth Circuit likewise held in a prisoner legal mail case that
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389

461 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 351, 359–60.
518 U.S. 343 (1996).
Id. at 351. On the access-to-court theory and standing, see infra Part IV.C.4.
Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d at 359.
Id. at 359–60 (citation omitted).
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350.
Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d at 359.
511 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1334.
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the chilling of private conferral with counsel stated a First Amendment
claim.390
Accordingly, when a prisoner objects on free speech grounds to
intrusion by prison officials into confidential legal mail, she need not “allege
any consequential injury stemming from that violation, aside from the
violation itself.”391
3. Standing for Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Claim
a. Showing of Prejudice When Seeking Retrospective Relief
Claims that a criminal defendant has been deprived of the Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel are most commonly encountered
in collateral or post-conviction challenges to a criminal conviction.392 Under
the classic and stringent test of Strickland v. Washington,393 to overturn a
conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the accused
ordinarily must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”394
But the Strickland test for prejudice is wholly inapposite when the Sixth
Amendment right is raised, not in an attempt to overturn a final judgment of
conviction because of failures by the defendant’s own counsel, but to be
compensated in a civil rights damages case (or, as discussed in the next
subsection, to obtain prospective relief to prevent ongoing or future
interference with assistance of counsel by the deliberate actions of the State).
More directly on point is the Supreme Court’s decision in Weatherford
v. Bursey.395 After a convicted criminal defendant discovered that a person
invited to a meeting between him and his lawyer was an undercover agent,
he filed a Section 1983 retrospective suit for compensatory damages.396 The
Court ruled that prejudice in the form of “tainted evidence” must be shown
to recover for an unconstitutional conviction.397 In that particular case, the
390

Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1212 (9th Cir. 2017).
Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d at 359; see also Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1334
(11th Cir. 2008) (same); Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1212 (same).
392
See, e.g., Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1374 (2015); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S.
156, 160-62 (2012); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 118–21 (2011); Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S.
139, 141 (2010); Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 15–16 (2009).
393
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
394
Id. at 694.
395
429 U.S. 545 (1977).
396
Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 484 (4th Cir. 1975).
397
Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 557–58.
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Court also noted that the episode was less likely to inhibit attorney-client
communications because the government did not deliberately send the agent
to the meeting—that is, it was not a “purposeful intrusion.”398 This third
party had been invited to the attorney-client meeting, so the problem could
have been avoided by simply excluding that person.399
After Weatherford, the courts demanded a showing of prejudice when
the person complaining about government invasion into the attorney-client
relationship seeks backward-looking relief, such as the request for damages
for an unconstitutional conviction in Weatherford or a direct or collateral
attack on a criminal conviction. For example, in United States v.
Danielson,400 a criminal defendant sought reversal of the conviction because
the state had surreptitiously obtained privileged trial strategy information
from the defense.401 Agreeing that “that the government improperly
interfered with [the defendant’s] attorney-client relationship,” the Ninth
Circuit held that the defendant had to show substantial prejudice but shifted
the burden to the government to prove that it had not obtained tainted
evidence.402
Even when the Sixth Amendment challenge is used in an attack on a
conviction, a less stringent test than the Strickland prejudice applies when
the state has purposefully interfered with the attorney-client relationship.
Instead, “substantial prejudice” is established by showing that the
prosecution gained “an unfair advantage of trial” by using confidential
information to introduce evidence or anticipate the strategies of the
defense.403
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,404 the Supreme Court held that no
further prejudice need be shown when the Sixth Amendment right to select
counsel of the defendant’s own choice is wrongly denied, because
“[d]eprivation of the right is ‘complete’ when the defendant is erroneously
prevented from being represented by the lawyer he wants.”405 The Court
explained that “erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, ‘with
consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate,
unquestionably qualifies as structural error.’”406 Because a person accused
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406

Id. at 554 n.4, 557–58.
Id.
325 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1071–73.
Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 585 (9th Cir. 2004).
548 U.S. 140 (2006).
Id. at 148.
Id. at 150 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282 (1993)).
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of a crime makes many decisions that “do not even concern the conduct of
the trial at all,” such as whether to plea bargain or cooperate with the
government, the Court reasoned that requiring the person to show prejudice
in such decisions by being deprived of legal counsel of choice “would be a
speculative inquiry into what might have been in an alternate universe.”407
Similarly, depriving a criminal defendant of the freedom to share
confidential information with an attorney because of a state policy or practice
of reading attorney-client correspondence goes directly to the underpinnings
of the right to assistance of counsel. And, here as well, trying to demonstrate
how interruption of the confidential attorney-client relationship by state
invasion has impacted litigation decisions is impossible to quantify and
further risks revelation of confidential information.408
b. No Need to Show Past Prejudice When Seeking Prospective Relief
A prejudice or actual-injury test simply has no purchase when a criminal
defendant objects to the government’s ongoing invasion of the confidential
relationship with the attorney, not in pursuit of money damages, but for a
prospective remedy to arrest the continuation of that interference. A criminal
defendant cannot be left without recourse until the government’s continuing
misconduct has prejudiced him to the point of depriving him of liberty, or
perhaps his very life. A death row inmate who experiences an ongoing
invasion by prison officers into his confidential communications with
counsel surely does not have to wait until an execution date has been set
before being allowed to object. Constitutional protections for the accused—
especially against “the odious practice of eavesdropping on privileged
communication between attorney and client”409—are not so hollow.
And, indeed, both in terms of other Sixth Amendment claims and a Sixth
Amendment claim involving legal mail, the courts have not demanded past
harm or some type of actual injury when the party seeks forward-looking
relief. As discussed immediately below, these courts recognize that the
required showing of Sixth Amendment prejudice for a prisoner seeking
prospective-only relief by challenging a prison policy or continuing pattern
is logically different from the type of harm that must be shown for such
retrospective relief as overturning a conviction on collateral attack or
obtaining damages for a civil rights action.410
407

Id. at 150.
On the risk of further revelation of confidential information, see infra Part IV.C.4.
409
State v. Fuentes, 318 P.3d 257, 258 (Wash. 2014) (quoting State v. Cory, 62 Wash. 2d
1019 (1963).
410
See Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2014).
408
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In Benjamin v. Fraser,411 the Second Circuit held that, when challenging
city jail regulations resulting in substantial and unpredictable delays in
attorney visits, pretrial detainees were not required to show actual injury to
present a Sixth Amendment claim. Because the right of an accused to the
assistance of counsel in an ongoing criminal proceeding “is provided directly
by the Constitution or federal law, a prisoner has standing to assert that right
even if the denial of that right has not produced an ‘actual injury.’”412
Similarly, in Luckey v. Harris,413 the Eleventh Circuit held that criminal
defendants did not have to prove “future inevitability of ineffective
assistance”414 to gain standing under the Sixth Amendment to challenge state
deficiencies in providing indigent representation. Because the Sixth
Amendment “protects rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial,” the
court held that criminal defendants did not have to wait until after they had
been convicted before raising a prospective objection to the infringement of
the right to assistance of counsel.415 Where a defendant seeks to overturn a
conviction, “powerful considerations” of finality, post-trial burdens on
counsel, and the independence of counsel warrant a demand that prejudice
be demonstrated.416 But the prejudice “standard is inappropriate for a civil
suit seeking prospective relief.”417
In Nordstrom v. Ryan,418 the Ninth Circuit held (over a dissent) that a
prisoner seeking to enjoin a prison policy allowing reading of confidential
legal mail need show no injury other than chilling interference with the
attorney-client relationship. As the court explained:
Were [the prisoner] challenging a conviction following an improper intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship, we would examine whether the violation caused prejudice
requiring the reversal of the conviction. [This] case, however, is a civil rights lawsuit
aimed at enjoining the continuation of an unconstitutional practice. The harm [the
prisoner] alleges is not that tainted evidence was used against him but that his right to
privately confer with counsel has been chilled. This is a plausible consequence of the
intentional reading of his confidential legal mail.419

411

264 F.3d 175, 184–88 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 185.
413
860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988).
414
Id. at 1016.
415
Id. at 1017.
416
Id.; see also Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004) (explaining Strickland
requirements to overturn criminal convictions as “show[ing] due regard for States’ finality
and comity interests”).
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Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017.
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Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2014).
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c. The Potential Problem of Mootness
Given that criminal cases proceed more rapidly on the court docket, a
prisoner who was covered by the Sixth Amendment when he attempted to
correspond confidentially with his criminal defense lawyer may find that the
underlying criminal case has concluded before the civil rights lawsuit on the
legal mail matter has reached a final judgment. As noted earlier, the Sixth
Amendment indisputably attaches to a person both at the trial and direct
appeal stage,420 but has not yet been extended to post-conviction
proceedings.421
A prisoner who initiates a civil complaint about interference with legal
mail while engaged in criminal defense may experience the transition of the
underlying matter from the criminal trial or appeal stages to post-conviction
proceedings. In this way, a case that properly had Sixth Amendment standing
when it began may become moot simply due to the passage of time.
The Supreme Court has explained that, “[i]n contrast [with standing],
by the time mootness is an issue, the case has been brought and litigated,
often (as here) for years. To abandon the case at an advanced stage may
prove more wasteful than frugal.”422
Given the comparatively quick disposition of a criminal appeal, the right
to confidential legal mail under the Sixth Amendment for Arizona prisoners
becomes an issue “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”423 The
“capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness has two
elements, which are readily met in a typical legal mail interference case:
With respect to the capable-of-repetition element, the prospect of a
vacation of a conviction or sentence may suffice. In Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart,424 the Supreme Court regarded the possibility that a
criminal defendant’s conviction could be reversed on appeal with a new trial
ordered as sufficient to show that another restrictive order on trial publicity
by the news media might be entered in the future.425 If the prisoner who
initiated the civil rights complaint during a criminal defense is still
corresponding with counsel on a post-conviction petition, the possibility that

420
See Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel applies equally to both trial and appellate counsel.”).
421
See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.
422
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 191–92 (2000).
423
See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 440 (2011) (quoting Southern
Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515).
424
427 U.S. 530 (1976).
425
Id. at 546.
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a criminal defendant’s conviction might be reversed and the case returned to
a trial posture supports the capability of repetition element.426
With respect to the evading-review element, given the comparatively
expeditious resolution of a criminal case, as contrasted with the period of
time necessary to fully adjudicate a civil rights complaint, “the litigation
window might never stay open long enough to resolve” the Sixth
Amendment question.427 This is especially true in a case of interference with
legal mail for a prisoner in a state prison. Because a criminal defendant in
the states typically is held in a city or county jail before and during trial, a
defendant is remanded to the custody of a state prison only after conviction.
Thus, the only stage of the direct criminal process that remains to unfold
during the period in which a prisoner is subject to a state prison legal mail
policy is the criminal appeal. The direct criminal appeal almost certainly will
be concluded before a newly-initiated civil rights complaint on the legal mail
practice or policy can proceed through the prison’s grievance process and
then be fully litigated through appellate review.428
Finally, even if the particular prisoner who presented the legal mail
complaint did not face repeated application of the state prison legal mail
policy in a Sixth Amendment context, mootness would not prevent the court
from deciding the question. Especially when prospective relief is sought
against a policy or practice, another prisoner will find him or herself in the
same position of resisting that prison’s interference with legal mail while
defending against a criminal charge. For example, in United States v.
Howard,429 the Ninth Circuit held that a challenge by criminal defendants to
a federal policy requiring the shackling of all defendants making their initial
appearance in a criminal case was not mooted by the conclusion of pretrial
proceedings, because the dispute was capable of repetition, yet evading
review.430 Although the court could not assume that the particular defendants

426
Hunt v. National Broadcasting Co., 872 F.2d 289, 291–92 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the possibility that a criminal defendant’s conviction might be reversed to support the
capability of repetition element).
427
See A.D. ex rel. L.D. v. Hawaii Dept. of Educ., 727 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2013)
(applying mootness exception where the upper age limit for special education services would
be reached in two years).
428
See Kingdomware Tech, Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (applying
mootness exception to a bid protest because, even though the government contract had since
been performed, “a period of two years is too short to complete judicial review of the
lawfulness of procurement”).
429
480 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2007).
430
Id. at 1008.
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would be charged in the future with other crimes, the shackling policy would
apply in the future to other criminal defendants.431
If there remained any doubt about the viability of and availability of full
relief from legal mail interference under the Sixth Amendment, the prisoner
would still and alternatively have standing for a claim under the First
Amendment until his release from custody.432
4. Standing for Right-of-Access-to-the-Courts Claim
As a general rule, under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lewis v. Casey,433
a prisoner asserting denial of access to the courts must prove an injury-infact by showing the prison’s policy or practice “hindered his efforts to pursue
a legal claim.”434
The courts have clarified that the showing of injury does not require
proof that the cause would have been lost on the merits but for the
government’s action or inaction. In Simkins v. Bruce,435 the Tenth Circuit
explained that the prisoner must show “an impediment or hindrance” to the
litigation, but was not required to “prove a case within a case to show that
the claim hindered or impeded by the defendant necessarily would have
prevailed.”436 While proof of an adverse outcome of a non-frivolous claim
certainly establishes a constitutional harm, demonstrating that the pursuit of
the claim was impeded is sufficient, such as showing that an opportunity to
respond or challenge an argument was lost437 or that opposing governmental
party gained “an unfair advantage” by having gaining access to confidential
attorney-client information.438
Most courts have held without analysis that, in contrast with free speech
claims,439 a prisoner asserting a right-of-access-to-the-courts claim involving

431

Id. at 1009–10.
For prisoner standing in a legal mail case under the First Amendment, see supra Part
IV.C.2.
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Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
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Id. at 351.
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Simkins v. Bruce, 406 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2005).
436
Id. at 1243–44.
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See id. at 1244; see also Penton v. Pool, 724 Fed. App’x 546, 549–50 (9th Cir. 2018)
(emphasizing that the “actual injury” requirement for standing in an access-to-courts claim “is
not an assessment of the merits of the underlying claim that is now lost,” and that prison
officials’ withholding of court mail that “frustrated [an inmate’s] ability to timely object” to a
magistrate judge’s ruling and then to timely appeal from the district court stated a claim).
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Cody v. Weber, 256 F.3d 764, 768–69 (8th Cir. 2001).
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See supra Part IV.C.2.
432

626

SISK, KING, NISSEN BEITZEL, DUFFUS & KOEHLER [Vol. 109

legal mail must satisfy this actual-injury test.440 But a strong argument can
be made that the Lewis actual injury requirement simply does not extend to
legal mail cases, at least where the prison has deliberately invaded
confidentiality through the reading attorney-client correspondence. Because
Lewis involved a claim of a purported right of access through affirmative
assistance by the prison by providing a law library, at least one court has held
that “Lewis does not speak to a prisoner’s right to litigate in the federal courts
without unreasonable interference.”441 In addition to a prisoner’s limited
right to affirmative assistance by the prison in gaining access to courts,
“prisoners have a right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to litigate
claims challenging their sentences or the conditions of their confinement to
conclusion without active interference by prison officials.”442 Accordingly,
when a prisoner alleges direct intrusion into the attorney-client relationship
by a prison officer through the reading of confidential legal mail, the prisoner
has simultaneously established standing and stated a claim for a violation of
the right to access the courts without active interference.
Moreover, an exacting actual-injury test would put a prisoner asserting
invasion of confidentiality in a classic “Catch-22” scenario. When a prisoner
shows the extraordinary action of a prison official in reading legal mail, the
defendant prison officials should not be rewarded for that misconduct by
forcing a prisoner to further disclose confidential information about his
strategy to contest a criminal conviction or prison conditions.
A ready analogy may be found in the way the courts address a party’s
complaint that his or her former attorney should be disqualified for a
successive conflict of interest. Under Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, a lawyer may not represent an adversary of a former
client if the two matters are “substantially related.”443 Under both federal and
state law, “the ethical prohibition against acceptance of adverse employment
involving prior confidential information includes potential as well as actual
use of previously-acquired privileged information,” such that “it matters not
whether confidences were in fact imparted; the underlying concern is the
possibility that [the lawyer] may have received confidential information from
[the former client] in a substantially related matter.”444 As the Seventh
Circuit explained in two classic decisions regarding successive conflicts, “it
is not appropriate for the court to inquire into whether actual confidences
440
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were disclosed,”445 because of “the difficulty of taking evidence on the
question without compromising the confidences themselves.”446
In sum, a prisoner should not have to prove that she was harmed by
seizure of confidential information by further disclosing that very
confidential information—especially to the government that is aggressively
seeking to uphold a conviction or defend against a charge of unconstitutional
prison conditions. Such a mandate for revelation is impossible to reconcile
with the constitutional protections surrounding the attorney-client
relationship.
D. RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE RELIEF IN LEGAL MAIL
CASES

The Prison Litigation Reform Act includes limitations on both
retrospective and prospective relief in prisoner cases challenging the
conditions of confinement,447 although these limitations should have little
bearing in most legal mail cases.
When a prisoner seeks retrospective relief in the form of damages, the
PLRA excludes recovery for “mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”448 While the apparent
purpose of this provision is to restrict recovery for a prisoner claiming
emotional harm without physical injury in an Eighth Amendment challenge
to physically-abusive prison conditions,449 some courts have applied the
limitation to other violations of constitutional rights.450 The circuits are
evenly-divided on whether a prisoner may recover damages (absent a
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physical injury) for a violation of the First Amendment rights of free exercise
of religion and free speech.451
In any event, even if the PLRA limitation were held inapplicable to a
claim for the intangible harm caused by a deliberate interference with the
attorney-client relationship, most prisoners likely would recover little more
than nominal damages. The injury to the attorney-client relationship being
difficult to quantify, and not comparable in immediacy and concreteness of
injury to episodes of physical abuse, a fact-finder is unlikely to award
substantial amounts of compensation for violating the confidentiality of mail.
Still, the PLRA limitation plainly does not apply prevent an award of
nominal damages and should not readily be understood to preclude punitive
damages.452 And when a pattern or policy is shown of deliberate intrusion
into confidential legal mail, especially after the right to confidentiality has
been clearly established,453 punitive damages are entirely appropriate.
Prospective relief is likely to be of greater value in most legal mail cases.
When a prisoner has experienced interference by the prison with confidential
attorney-client communications, he is likely to be primarily concerned that
the invasion be recognized as wrongful in nature and that it not continue.
The PLRA also limits the availability of prospective relief to that which
is “necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular
plaintiff or plaintiffs.”454 Before granting injunctive relief, or accepting a
consent decree that includes injunctive relief, the court must “find[] that such
relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right.”455 In making that evaluation, the
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court “shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or
the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.”456
Given the nature of the wrong involved in legal mail cases, these
statutory limitations on injunctive relief should be easily accommodated.
First, in a legal mail case, the prospective remedy would be targeted to the
particular harm of opening legal mail outside the prisoner’s presence or
reading it, which would not prevent such other security measures as physical
inspection for contraband. Thus, such an “[i]njunction does not require court
supervision, [it] enjoins only enforcement of the unconstitutional policy and
does not interfere with prison mail security measures.”457 Second, because
prisons have no legitimate need to read the contents of attorney-client
correspondence,458 absent individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, any claim
of a “public safety” concern would be strained. And, third, as for concerns
about “the operation of a criminal justice system,” a prison’s intrusion into
the attorney-client relationship poses a danger to the criminal justice system
and thus judicial relief would bolster criminal justice.
To be entitled to injunctive relief in general, a civil rights plaintiff must
demonstrate “that he is realistically threatened by a repetition of the
experience” that constitutes a constitutional violation.459 As the Ninth Circuit
has explained, “[t]here are at least two ways in which to demonstrate that
such injury is likely to recur”:460
First, “a plaintiff may show that the defendant had, at the time of the
injury, a written policy, and that the injury ‘stems from’ that policy.” 461
When a prison has a policy that by its terms allows invasion of confidential
attorney-client correspondence, and thus “the harm alleged is directly
traceable to a written policy, there is an implicit likelihood of its repetition in
the immediate future.”462
Second, and alternatively, “the plaintiff may demonstrate that the harm
is part of a ‘pattern of officially sanctioned . . . behavior, violative of the
456
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plaintiffs’ [federal] rights.’”463 Thus, if the prison administration has
affirmed a corrections officer’s conduct (such as denying a grievance filed
by the prisoner)464 or fails to take action after being informed of the problem
(such as by the filing of a grievance by the prisoner), then the officer’s
behavior would have been “officially sanctioned.”465 Likewise, if a pattern
or practice of interference with legal mail is proven, the prison administration
would be accountable for ongoing behavior and its failure to bring it to a
stop.466
As another form of prospective judicial relief, a prisoner may be entitled
to a declaratory judgment regarding the unconstitutionality of the State’s
intrusion into the confidentiality of a prisoner’s communications with his
lawyer. A declaratory judgment is in order when the plaintiff shows “the
particularized nature of the harms alleged,” “the prospect of future
interference by the officials,” and “the Government’s failure to disavow
application of the challenged” policy or practice.467
E. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR PRISON OFFICERS IN LEGAL MAIL
CASES

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,468 the Supreme Court concluded that the proper
“balance between the evils” of abuse of office by government officials and
the social costs of litigation against government officials (which run against
the innocent as well as the guilty) was best measured by affording qualified,
but not absolute, immunity to those officials.469 The question of whether
qualified immunity covers the defendant official’s conduct turns upon the
objective reasonableness of the official’s conduct.470 In defining the standard
for qualified immunity, the Harlow Court expressed the crucial inquiry as
whether the official violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional
463
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rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”471 By adopting an
objective test for qualified immunity, the Court insisted that it was not
thereby granting any “license to lawless conduct” because the public interest
in deterring official wrongdoing is adequately protected by a test that focuses
upon the objective reasonableness of the official’s acts.472 As the Court later
said in Brosseau v. Haugen,473 “[b]ecause the focus is on whether the officer
had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged
against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.”474
With respect to claims for damages, the right of a prisoner to relief when
a prison employee has invaded attorney-client correspondence depends on
whether the right to confidentiality in legal mail was clearly established in
that jurisdiction at the time of the episode.
The progression toward clear establishment of a right to confidentiality
in legal mail right is well-illustrated by developments in the Sixth Circuit. In
1993, in Lavado v. Keohane,475 when evaluating whether defendant prison
officials were entitled to qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit remarked that
the circuit had not yet “clearly established” that opening or reading legal mail
violated “constitutional rights in and of itself.”476 Even so, the court reversed
summary judgment for the defendants, concluding it was well-established
“that opening/reading inmates’ mail in ‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious’ fashion
does violate inmates’ First Amendment rights.”477 Later, in 2003, in Sallier
v. Brooks,478 the Sixth Circuit stated that while the confidentiality of mail to
a prisoner from a court had not been well-settled, “[a]ttorney mail is, of
course, an altogether different story.”479 The court denied qualified immunity
for opening mail from an attorney outside of the prisoner’s presence.480
Subsequently, in 2009, in Merriweather v. Zamora,481 the Sixth Circuit
confirmed that opening a prisoner’s legal mail outside of his presence now
did violate “clearly established” First and Sixth Amendment rights.482
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Finally, qualified immunity for individual officers is not available in an
action for declaratory or injunctive relief.483 Qualified immunity applies only
to claims for monetary damages.484
CONCLUSION
No one in our society has a more compelling need to communicate in
complete confidence with a lawyer than a prisoner, especially one on death
row, when challenging a conviction as wrongful or prison conditions as
unlawful. No one has a greater need to be able to engage in the uninhibited
discussion of highly personal matters, tragic events, and official misconduct.
Courts must be vigilant in assuring that a prisoner’s right to effective and
attentive counsel is not compromised by prison officials who pry into
confidential communications.
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